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Abstract
The coming of the New Deal may have spelled the end of the Lochner era in the federal courts, but in the state
courts Lochner's doctrine of economic substantive due process lives on. Since the New Deal, courts in almost
every state have rebuffed the United States Supreme Court and have interpreted their own state constitutions'
due process clauses to provide substantive protections to economic liberties. This Article presents a
comprehensive survey of state court use of economic substantive due process since the New Deal. It includes
an enumeration of every instance since 1940 of a state court of highest review protecting economic liberties
through state constitutional economic substantive due process. Previous work on the subject has examined
this post-New Deal rejection of the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence, but this is the first study to
comprehensively analyze the trends of that rejection.
This comprehensive analysis reveals an intriguing, and potentially controversial, discovery. The discovery is
that although state courts still to some degree apply state constitutional economic substantive due process in
protecting economic liberties, the rate of that application declined dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. The
decline is surprising considering that through the 1940s, 1950s, and even 1960s, a full thirty years after the
New Deal, state courts did not shy from invoking the long-past ghost of Lochner. This Article argues that the
reason for this relatively sudden decline is that many state judges were comfortable applying economic
substantive due process until the coming of Roe v. Wade and its related right to privacy cases. Because the
right to privacy cases utilized substantive due process, but of the non-economic variety, a continued use of
economic substantive due process provided legitimacy to their holdings. Faced with either legitimizing
opinions legalizing abortion and other privacy rights, or rejecting substantive due process altogether,
conservative state jurists chose the latter. These conservatives joined with progressive jurists who were already
hostile toward the protection of economic liberties. Thus, with these strange bedfellows aligned, the use of
economic substantive due process under state constitutional law quickly withered into the rare, but not quite
extinct, doctrine that it is today.
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Brennan could not have been more wrong.  In a famous 1977 
article for the Harvard Law Review, Justice William J. Brennan exhorted 
state courts to pick up some of the protection of individual liberties that the 
U.S. Supreme Court had vigorously employed during the 1960s, but had 
retreated from in the 1970s.1  In his “call to arms” Justice Brennan 
emphasized a fundamental cornerstone of state constitutional law:  that 
states may interpret their own constitutions to afford greater protection of 
individual liberties than the U.S. Constitution, even when the constitutional 
provisions in question are worded identically.2  Justice Brennan focused on 
                                                          
 1. Justice Brennan was inviting state courts to protect individual liberties when the 
federal courts would not, and he gave credit to the work that state courts were already 
pursuing in this task.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions & the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977) (noting with approval that “more and 
more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of 
Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal 
provisions, even those identically phrased”); see also G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial 
Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1997) (stating that Justice 
Brennan’s “disagreement with the conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme Court gave 
him reason to encourage the development of state constitutional law”). 
 2. Brennan, supra note 1, at 495.  State courts repeatedly emphasize their independent 
ability to afford greater protection under their own constitutions than is federally required.  
See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990) (“[T]his Court has not 
hesitated to interpret article I, § 12 independently of its Federal counterpart when the 
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three areas in his article:  equal protection,3 procedural due process 
protections of governmental benefits4 (often labeled the “new property”5), 
and the “specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights against encroachment by 
state action.”6  In these areas, Brennan saw state courts “beginning to 
emphasize the protections of their states’ own bills of rights,” a 
development he considered to be of recent vintage, and something that 
needed to grow.7  Other writings of the time recognized this development 
and entitled it the “New Judicial Federalism.”8 
Justice Brennan’s exhortation was a needed recognition of the 
importance of state constitutions in our system of federalism and a timely 
reminder to the legal community not to forget our dual system of 
constitutionalism.9  That being said, for some inexplicable reason Justice 
Brennan completely omitted a field of state constitutional law in which 
states had been actively pursuing this “New Judicial Federalism” for years.  
The omission is truly staggering.  The field he neglected to include among 
the three mentioned above is the protection of economic liberties.  These 
liberties include the right to contract and the right to make a living, 
especially as protected through the doctrine of “economic substantive due 
                                                          
analysis by the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened to undercut the right of our 
citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusions.”). 
 3. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 491 (noting that state courts should be particularly 
concerned with cases involving state legislative classifications that impermissibly interfere 
with fundamental rights, such as “the rights to vote, to travel interstate, or to bear or beget a 
child”). 
 4. See id. at 492 (explaining that “[t]he root requirement of due process is that, except 
for some extraordinary situations, an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before 
he is deprived of any significant ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest”). 
 5. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (noting that welfare entitlements 
and other contractual governmental benefits are today widely considered to be property 
rather than a gratuity of the state (citing Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 
733 (1964))). 
 6. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 492 (noting that the incorporation of many aspects of 
the Bill of Rights against the states has been particularly strong in “the administration of the 
criminal justice system”). 
 7. Id. at 495. 
 8. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 
1192-94 (1977) (describing the trend towards U.S. Supreme Court deference to state 
adjudication); see also Tarr, supra note 1, at 1099 (developing an understanding of the 
causes and magnitude of the shift towards protection of rights by state constitutional 
guarantees). 
 9. In fact, Justice Brennan called himself “a devout believer” in “our concept of 
federalism.”  Brennan, supra note 1, at 502.  Brennan was emphatically correct in 
diagnosing the general lack of importance placed upon state constitutional law.  Law school 
curricula of the time reflected the paucity of interest in state constitutional law:  “Law 
schools . . . must share the blame for the failure by counsel and the courts to do justice to 
state constitutions.  The typical course in constitutional law now virtually ignores the 
existence of state constitutions.”  James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive Judicial Review of 
Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions:  The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 
241, 243, 246 (1981).  Whether instruction is now better after thirty years of the “New 
Judicial Federalism” is beyond the scope of this article. 
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process.”10  Justice Brennan even went so far as to suggest that this field 
did not exist, asserting that “courts do not today substitute their personal 
economic beliefs for the judgments of our democratically elected 
legislatures.”11  In using the phrase “do not today,” Brennan was 
distinguishing modern jurisprudence from the practices of the Supreme 
Court during the “Lochner era,” in which the Court utilized the Federal 
Constitution’s Due Process Clauses12 to strike down economic regulations 
and protect economic liberties.13 
This last assertion ignored forty years of state courts wielding the 
doctrine of economic substantive due process in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s renunciation of the Lochner era.14  It is even more perplexing that 
Justice Brennan did not discuss this history given that its existence was no 
mystery by 1977.15  As will be discussed in detail throughout this Article, 
                                                          
 10. See infra Part I.A (defining economic substantive due processs and discussing the 
ways in which courts have used the doctrine). 
 11. Brennan, supra note 1, at 490-91 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 
(1963), which held that a Kansas statute implicating economic rights did not violate due 
process and noting that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide that such legislation was 
needed to deal with a particular industry).  While it might be suggested that Justice Brennan 
was referring only to federal courts’ refusal to supplant the judgment of legislatures, he fails 
to make any reference to contemporaneous state court decisions protecting economic 
liberties. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 13. The phrase “Lochner era” refers to a period characterized by Supreme Court 
decisions like that of its namesake, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 64 (1905), in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down legislation limiting employment in New York 
bakeries to sixty hours per week and ten hours per day as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  See infra Part II.A (discussing the growth and decline 
of economic substantive due process jurisprudence during the Lochner era). 
 14. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text (describing the transition from 
protection of economic liberties through substantive due process during the Lochner era to 
application of a lower “rational basis” standard for determining the validity of state 
economic regulations). 
 15. Many scholarly articles have documented the preservation of economic substantive 
due process in state courts.  See, e.g., John A.C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation & 
Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 226-27 (1958-1959) (“Since the 
abandonment by the Supreme Court of substantive due process as a test of the validity of 
state economic regulation, there have been many conflicting decisions in the substantive due 
process field in the state courts.”); John A. Hoskins & David A. Katz, Substantive Due 
Process in the States Revisited, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 386 (1957) (“These state courts 
continue to insist, as did the pre-1934 federal judiciary, that legislative enactment of state 
public policy be tempered by what the state courts believe to be desirable, effective and 
proper.”); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts & Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger 
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 883 (1976) (“[N]otwithstanding the Supreme Court’s post-1937 
‘hands-off’ posture in the economic sphere, studies of state court decisions have made it 
clear that substantive due process has lived on in the states.”); Monrad G. Paulsen, The 
Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91, 92 (1950) 
(“[S]ome state supreme courts when interpreting the due process clause or its equivalent in 
their state constitutions have continued to interfere freely with legislative policies.”); Note, 
Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309, 321 (1963) (“The 
increasing frequency of such decisions indicates that economic due process is neither dead 
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from 1937 through the present day, almost every state court of highest 
review has interpreted its own constitution’s Due Process Clause and 
similar provisions, to strike down economic regulations.  These state courts 
have done so even when explicitly acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has interpreted the equivalent language in the U.S. Constitution to 
not extend such protection of economic liberties.16  This protection includes 
the invalidation of economic regulations in many different areas of 
economic affairs, such as occupational licensing, advertising, and price 
controls.17 
Past studies of this phenomenon have covered all of these areas of 
economic activity and have performed in-depth analysis of specific state 
court decisions that is beyond the scope of this Article.18  What all past 
studies have lacked, however, is a systematic attempt to catalog every 
economic substantive due process opinion under state constitutional law 
since the close of the Lochner era.  This Article does just that.  It presents 
every instance of a state court of highest review protecting economic 
liberties through the use of the doctrine of economic substantive due 
process, as that term is defined in Part I, under state constitutional law since 
1940.19 
                                                          
nor dying and that it is the United States Supreme Court, rather than the state courts, which 
is resisting the current drift in constitutional interpretation.”). 
The fact that numerous studies exist has not prevented more recent studies from ignoring 
post-New Deal economic substantive due process under state constitutional law.  See, e.g., 
Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism:  State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1412 n.5 (1999).  Schapiro cites G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 165-66 (1998), for the proposition that “from 1950 to 1969, state courts 
relied on state constitutions to afford greater protection than was available under the [United 
States] constitution only 10 times.”  As this Article illustrates, that proposition is completely 
false.  It may stem from an understanding of “rights” that only encompasses those embraced 
by Justice Brennan, ignoring those related to economic liberties.  See supra notes 3-7 and 
accompanying text (noting that Brennan’s article discussed equal protection, procedural due 
process, and the provisions of the Bill of Rights prohibiting the states from encroaching 
upon certain rights of individuals).  If that is so, it would be helpful for such studies to point 
out that underlying assumption. 
 16. See infra Appendix A (listing all cases uncovered by this study where state courts 
have used economic substantive due process to protect economic liberties, with the 
exception of land use zoning cases); see also infra Part III.A (providing examples of state 
courts protecting economic liberties and acknowledging that other courts might not take the 
same position). 
 17. See infra Part II.B.2 (providing specific examples of enforcement of economic 
substantive due process rights to demonstrate the scope of the doctrine’s impact on disparate 
areas of commerce). 
 18. See, e.g., Joshua A. Newberg, In Defense of Aston Park:  The Case For State 
Substantive Due Process Review of Health Care Regulation, 68 N.C. L. REV. 253, 257-59 
(1990) (analyzing cases in which state courts have applied economic substantive due 
process review of healthcare regulations); Gabriella S. Tussusov, A Modern Look at 
Substantive Due Process:  Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation Under the New 
York and Federal Constitutions, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 529, 567 (1988) (focusing on the 
application of economic substantive due process by New York courts since 1937). 
 19. Appendix A presents the complete enumeration of relevant cases.  The inclusion of 
only state courts of highest review, which are generically referred to below as “state 
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The absence of a full-fledged “compendium” of economic substantive 
due process cases under state constitutional law has frustrated attempts to 
more deeply inquire into how frequently state courts have protected 
economic liberty via economic substantive due process, and what the trends 
in that frequency have been.  Admitted one scholar in 1981, “[n]o single 
study has purported to collect all the state cases in this area . . . .”20  
Another, admitting she lacked the benefit of an overall analysis data set, 
stated that “an overwhelming majority of states appear to have viable 
precedents for judicial invalidation of economic measures on due process 
grounds.”21  Not only this, but because she lacked a comprehensive set of 
cases in the area, it was reasonable of her to conclude, in 1988, that there 
was a “growing national trend on the state level toward active review” of 
economic regulation.22  This study’s data illustrate that by 1988 the actual 
trend was moving in the opposite direction. 
Pursuant to its data, this Article presents the discovery that in the 1970s, 
and especially the 1980s, state court enforcement of economic substantive 
due process began to wane.23  This discovery leads one to believe that 
perhaps Justice Brennan was correct to omit an area of state constitutional 
law otherwise worthy of the “New Judicial Federalism.”  This does not 
mean that by 1977 economic substantive due process under state 
constitutional law was dead, just that it was about to enter a much leaner 
stage than before.24 
This Article begins in Part I with the methodology used in determining 
when a case falls under the definition of “economic substantive due 
process” used here.  Part II opens with a brief history of the doctrine of 
                                                          
supreme courts,” instead of all state courts, is made for reasons of research convenience.  
The present research includes decisions from fifty courts covering sixty-five years of case 
law, and although an army of researchers would be needed to scour the state lower courts, 
the Author suspects that the trends at those levels would not differ significantly. 
 20. Kirby, supra note 9, at 252. 
 21. Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 n.7 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).  The present author also was taken in by the seductive 
allure of isolated state cases not set against a comprehensive study of trends in the law.  See 
Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial:  How Challenging Casket 
Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 668, 678 (2004) (arguing that federal and state courts have recently enforced 
the doctrine of economic substantive due process to a greater degree).  The trend in lower 
federal courts, however, does appear (but, yes, only “appear”) to be on the upswing, despite 
the Supreme Court’s apparent refusal to revive it.  See id. at 678-80 (listing recent federal 
cases striking down economic regulations under a substantive reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 23. See infra notes 169-176 and accompanying text (indicating that state supreme 
courts decided sixty-seven cases involving economic substantive due process in the 1960s, 
eleven cases in the 1980s, and eight cases in the 1990s); see also infra Appendix B 
(presenting data regarding the use of economic substantive due process by all state supreme 
courts). 
 24. See infra Part IV (discussing reasons for the decline of economic substantive due 
process after the 1970s). 
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economic substantive due process and of how it found favor in the Lochner 
era of the early twentieth century.  It then moves on to an overview of state 
court applications of economic substantive due process since 1940 and of 
the different contexts in which it has arisen.  Part III presents the state-by-
state findings of the study, summarizing the data included in the 
Appendices and highlighting a few states that are particularly revealing of 
the trends in economic substantive due process at the state level over the 
last sixty-five years.25  Finally, in Part IV the Article addresses the question 
of why the rate at which state courts used economic substantive due 
process dropped so precipitously in the 1970s and 1980s.  The Article 
suggests that in the wake of the non-economic substantive due process case 
Roe v. Wade,26 and similar “right to privacy” cases, former defenders of the 
doctrine recognized its similarity with that underlying Roe.  These former 
defenders of economic substantive due process, and otherwise supporters 
of the free market, chose to then shy away from the doctrine instead of 
pursuing the more problematic task of distinguishing it from its non-
economic cousin. 
I.  DEFINING ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:  WHAT IS INCLUDED 
IN THIS STUDY AND WHAT IS NOT 
Before diving into the findings of this study, or presenting its historical 
background, this Part briefly outlines the study’s methodology.  The 
following explains what qualifies a case to be included in the study.  This is 
more complicated than it may at first appear, and is highly contingent on 
the right that a court protects, and the constitutional basis the court uses in 
protecting that right.27 
                                                          
 25. For those interested in examining the Article’s actual data, Appendix A enumerates, 
alphabetically by state, every economic substantive due process case since 1940, and 
Appendix B numerically summarizes these cases by decade and state. 
 26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 27. It should be noted how the cases composing this study were discovered.  That has 
been accomplished through scouring past articles on the subject, reading cases cited by, and 
those that have cited, opinions known to be economic substantive due process opinions, and 
through searches of online legal databases such as Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw.  The searches 
have been of the form “‘police power’ w/20 unconstitutional’“ and “‘due process’ w/20 
unconstitutional.’“  In addition, for states that lack an explicit “due process” clause, a search 
including the state constitution’s particular language was added.  This study does not 
purport to have found every relevant case since 1940.  Doubtless there are cases that the 
Author simply missed, that searches were not open-ended enough to find, or that the Author 
incorrectly judged to not fall within the definition of “economic substantive due process” 
used here.  As a glance of Appendix B makes clear, the omission of even a few cases in a 
single state could indeed change the results of this study as regards that state, especially as 
regards decade-by-decade data.  However, as regards national trends over each decade, 
more than a few omissions would be needed to alter the conclusions. 
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A. What Falls Under the “Economic Substantive Due Process” Umbrella 
This study is a comprehensive review of when state courts of highest 
review have struck down economic regulations through the doctrine of 
economic substantive due process under state constitutional law since 
1940.  Simply put, the study has included cases that fall under the rubric of 
Lochner era jurisprudence.  The cases that qualify for this understanding 
are instances of state courts protecting Lockean rights of an economic 
nature.28  Whatever the merits of “natural rights theory,” it is these rights, 
i.e. the right to contract, to hold property, to be free from government-
imposed monopolies, et cetera, that the Lochner era Court often 
protected.29  From the Lochner era through the present, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has protected other “natural rights” of a non-economic nature, but 
these decisions fall outside of the scope of this study.30  For the sake of 
convenience this Article employs the term “economic liberties” in referring 
to these “natural rights of an economic nature.” 
                                                          
 28. This term, of course, relates back to English philosopher John Locke.  Locke argued 
that prior to the institution of government every man has the right to preserve himself, and 
lacks the right to “take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of life, the 
liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 101-02 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) 
(1690).  That is, without government, one has a right to one’s own life, liberty, and property, 
but not to governmental protection of them.  Id.  Numerous scholars have discussed 
“Lockean” rights and their place in interpreting the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 10-18 (1985) (attempting to interpret the Takings Clause in a 
way “which is consistent with the basic Lockean design”); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper 
Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 442-43 (2004) (“[T]he basic 
concept of natural rights was clear:  Natural or inherent rights are the rights persons have 
independent of those they are granted by government . . . .”). 
 29. See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text (providing examples of Lochner-era 
cases that protected economic rights).  Some scholars, most notably Professor Sunstein, take 
the view that the Lochner-era Court was not in the business of protecting Lockean rights so 
much as enforcing the proper scope of the police power set against the baseline of the 
common law.  See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 
(1987).  Other scholars have argued that Lochner-era decisions involved the judiciary’s 
attempt to combat class legislation, and not to preserve a laissez-faire economic system.  
See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE 6-10 (1993) (reviewing revisionist legal 
historians and their contentions that the courts of the time scrutinized legislation through an 
equality context).  But see Barnett, supra note 28, at 489 (stating that Gillman misses how 
“the resistance to class-based legislation was seen as a means to the protection of natural 
rights, rather than an end in itself”).  The Author makes note of these alternate views here, 
but contends that they do not affect which cases should be included in this study.  Whether 
the cases in Appendix A were decided in order to protect the public from special interests, 
or in order to defend the rights of certain members of the public, the end result is that the 
courts struck down economic regulations and in so doing protected economic liberties. 
 30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (protecting right to engage 
in consensual homosexual sodomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) 
(protecting right of married couples to purchase contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (protecting right to educate one’s child in a private school); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (protecting right to learn a language of 
one’s choice). 
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For the most part the Lochner Court protected economic liberties 
through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution.31  On the whole, state courts that have struck 
down economic regulations on the grounds that they violate an individual’s 
economic liberties have also grounded their opinions in due process 
clauses.32  This is not entirely true, however.  Many times state courts have 
struck down economic regulations because the regulations are an 
illegitimate use of the “police power.”33  The “police power” plays a central 
role because the government will usually argue that its actions are justified 
under its authority to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and 
morals—otherwise known as its police power authority.34  This is 
especially true when it comes to courts examining local ordinances.  Often 
a state’s constitutional structure is such that a local government only 
possesses the powers ceded to it by the state legislature.35  One often-ceded 
power is that of promoting the public health and safety, or some similar 
public benefit.36  A court will typically inquire into what this ceded “police 
power” encompasses and whether the challenged governmental action is a 
valid, or invalid, use of the power.37  When a court invalidates an economic 
                                                          
 31. See infra Part II.A (noting that after the Court narrowly interpreted the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, it turned to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to strike down regulations that infringe upon economic liberties). 
 32. See Howard, supra note 15, at 882-83 (contrasting the unwillingness of federal 
courts to protect economic activity under substantive due process with aggressive protection 
in the state courts under due process clauses of state constitutions). 
 33. See, e.g., Hand v. H & R Block, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Ark. 1975) (concluding 
that a franchise regulation was effectively a minimum price requirement and finding that the 
regulation exceeded the permissible scope of the state’s police power); United Interchange, 
Inc. of Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97, 99-100 (Me. 1958) (striking down a ban on real 
estate advertising in magazines as an improper exercise of the state’s police power). 
 34. The Florida Supreme Court provided a good description of the police power, a term 
frequently used by courts in various jurisdictions, as illustrated in Appendix A, and its 
legitimate uses:  “It requires no extensive citation of authorities to support the proposition 
that in order to justify the exercise of the police power the Legislature must be supported by 
some sound basis of necessity to protect the public morals, health, safety or welfare.”  
Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 1958).  Lochner v. New York contains similar 
language: 
It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the 
police power by the State . . . . [W]here the protection of the Federal Constitution is 
sought [against a state’s exercise of police power,] the question necessarily arises:  
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, 
or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the 
individual to his personal liberty . . . ? 
198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
 35. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4-6 (ceding limited power to local governments, 
except when a local government specially petitions for greater powers or when the 
legislature grants additional powers). 
 36. See, e.g., City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 84 (Iowa 1942) (recognizing the 
legislature’s grant of power to municipal corporations “to pass ordinances necessary for the 
safety, health, prosperity, order, comfort, convenience, etc., of its inhabitants”). 
 37. See, e.g., id. (stating that the test of the validity of a regulation limiting the right of 
an individual to “pursue his trade or business” pursuant to the state’s power to protect public 
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regulation in this manner the result is the protection of an economic liberty.  
For the same reasons this study includes cases that do not mention the 
words “police power” or “due process” at all but merely conclude that a 
regulation is “arbitrary and unreasonable,”38 or “not affected with a public 
interest.”39  The same is true for various other formulations state supreme 
courts have used to strike down economic regulations without citing to 
specific constitutional regulations.40  All of these formulations are used to 
protect Lockean economic rights,41 and therefore this study includes them. 
Lawyers whose entire experience with constitutional law consists of 
reading the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations of it might 
be surprised to discover that “due process” clauses are only one of the 
provisions through which state constitutions protect economic liberties.  
Each state constitution presents, of course, a different text with different 
clauses to interpret.  Not only that, but a few state constitutions lack a “due 
process” clause entirely.42  In spite of this, since 1940, courts in all states 
lacking a due process clause have protected economic liberty through the 
use of “economic substantive due process,”43 and courts in many other 
states have used constitutional clauses to protect economic liberty in 
addition to their respective due process clauses. 
                                                          
health or safety is whether the regulation has a “definite relation to the ends sought to be 
attained”). 
 38. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 847-48 
(Ky. 1944) (determining that an ordinance preventing a restaurant from opening between 
midnight and four o’clock a.m. was arbitrary and unreasonable); Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 
108, 109-11 (Pa. 1959) (finding that an ordinance banning the importation of garbage into a 
town was arbitrary and unreasonable). 
 39. See, e.g., Estell v. City of Birmingham, 286 So. 2d 872, 874, 876 (Ala. 1973) 
(finding that an anti-ticket scalping law was not affected with a public interest and thus was 
an unconstitutional limitation upon ticket resellers); Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 
353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. 1987) (finding that the “right to contract” is a property right within 
the scope of the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution and stating that the Georgia 
legislature may not abridge that right unless the business being regulated is “affected with a 
public interest”). 
 40. See, e.g., Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) 
(striking down law prohibiting automobile dealers from selling auto insurance on grounds 
that there was no “good cause” for the law); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 
219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb. 1974) (concluding that a dairy regulation imposing maximum 
costs on products “is an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty”); 
Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941) (holding that a ban on the advertising of 
barbering prices interferes with property rights); Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of 
Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 1971) (concluding that licensing procedures for 
psychologists were unduly restrictive). 
 41. See supra notes 28-29 (discussing historical understandings of Lockean rights and 
their role in the development of constitutional law). 
 42. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (noting that some states have managed 
to protect economic liberties by recognizing analogous protections under other clauses of 
their respective state constitutions). 
 43. The only three states that have not protected economic liberty through economic 
substantive due process under state constitutional law since 1940 are Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Rhode Island.  See infra Appendix B.  The constitutions of all three states have a due 
process clause.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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The states lacking a “due process” clause usually have a “law of the 
land” clause that its highest court has interpreted as possessing an identical 
meaning to “due process.”44  In addition, some states have used other, 
sometimes unique, clauses to protect economic liberties.  Since 1940 state 
supreme courts have found economic regulations unconstitutional because 
they violate clauses in their states’s constitution, such as the individual 
liberty45 and anti-monopoly46 clauses of the Arkansas Constitution, the 
absolute and arbitrary power clause of the Kentucky Constitution,47 the 
life’s basic necessities clause of the Montana Constitution,48 and the 
declaration of rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution.49  Many cases 
interpreting these clauses do essentially the same thing:  conclude that a 
regulation impermissibly violates an individual’s economic liberties.50 
For the sake of convenience, the rest of this Article refers to “economic 
substantive due process” in referring to economic substantive due process 
itself and the similar bases outlined above, including other constitutional 
clauses interpreted to protect economic liberties, “police power” cases, and 
“arbitrary and unreasonable” cases. 
                                                          
 44. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Mass. 1986) (“The 
phrase ‘law of the land’ does not refer to the statutory law of the Commonwealth, as it exists 
from time to time.  Rather, it refers, in language found in Magna Carta, to the concept of due 
process of law.”); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1975) (“It has been a 
long-standing tenet of Pennsylvania jurisprudence that ‘the law of the land’ in Article I, 
Section 9 is synonymous with ‘due process of law.’”). 
 45. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2.  In McCastlain v. R. & B. Tobacco Co., 411 S.W.2d 882, 
885 (Ark. 1967), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that a regulation requiring a 
cigarette wholesaler to obtain letters of credit from cigarette manufacturers as a condition of 
obtaining a cigarette wholesaler’s permit violated the state constitution’s individual liberty 
clause. 
 46. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19.  See N. Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 
184 S.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Ark. 1944) (striking down taxi licensing scheme as a violation of 
state constitution’s anti-monopoly clause). 
 47. KY. CONST. § 2.  See Remote Servs., Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 81-83 (Ky. 
1989) (striking down minimum mark-up law as facially unconstitutional under “Absolute 
and Arbitrary Power” Clause). 
 48. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.  See Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 
1996) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate a rule forbidding a state employed 
property appraiser from working as an independent realtor because it violated the right to 
“pursue life’s basic necessities”). 
 49. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.  See Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940) 
(declaring the Fair Sale Act unconstitutional under the Declaration of Rights of the State 
Constitution). 
 50. An early article concerning economic substantive due process in state courts since 
the demise of the Lochner era also lumped together “due process” cases proper, and those 
protecting economic liberties through similar constitutional clauses.  See Paulsen, supra 
note 15, at 93 n.10 (noting that the author of the article used the phrase “due process” to 
“refer to clauses in state constitutions which are phrased differently from the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as those which are identical to it” and stating that “[w]hatever the 
wording, these clauses . . . have placed unspecified general limitations on legislative 
power”). 
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B.  What is not Included in This Study 
Although this study includes cases where state supreme courts have 
protected economic liberties under due process clauses, it purposely does 
not include many other cases where state supreme courts have 
accomplished similar results under other clauses.  A court may strike down 
an economic regulation on, of course, a variety of constitutional grounds.  
For instance, federal courts may employ the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth51 and Fourteenth Amendments,52 but they also have at their disposal 
the Equal Protection Clause,53 the Takings Clause,54 and the Contracts 
Clause.55  State courts have utilized equivalents of all of these examples in 
striking down economic regulations.56  However, just as they are under the 
U.S. Constitution, state court interpretations of these various constitutional 
provisions are historically distinct from the doctrine of economic 
substantive due process.  To include such clauses in this study would turn 
the Article into a demonstration of how state courts protect economic 
liberties at large, and not the more focused question of how the 
underpinnings of the Lochner court have survived to this day under state 
constitutional law. 
This study also does not include some instances of state supreme courts 
striking down economic regulations under what might be labeled 
substantive applications of a due process clause.  One example is state 
court decisions striking down statutory caps on tort damages.57  Such 
decisions are not examples of courts protecting Lockean rights but, of 
courts protecting governmental procedural guarantees.  Therefore, these 
                                                          
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).  
 53. Id. 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “private property [shall not] be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 475 P.2d 679, 680-83 (Haw. 1970) 
(utilizing state equal protection clause to strike down a statute requiring certain employers to 
partially compensate employees for time served on a jury or a public board); Clem v. 
Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 781-85 (Ind. 1991) (applying state contracts clause to 
invalidate a statute barring covenants and other restrictions in residential conveyances 
specifically prohibiting use of the property as a residential facility for the developmentally 
disabled or the mentally ill); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769-70, 779, 
784 (Mich. 2004) (employing state takings clause, to strike down the use of eminent domain 
to stimulate the local economy by condemning private property to construct a business and 
industrial park). 
 57. See generally Patricia J. Chupkovich, Comment, Statutory Caps:  An Involuntary 
Contribution to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for 
Obtaining Affordable Health Care?, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 337, 352-54 (1993) 
(identifying state court decisions holding that statutory caps on non-economic damages in 
tort cases violate substantive due process). 
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decisions fall outside the scope of this study. 
Additionally, this study largely excludes review of local governmental 
land use zoning decisions.  The reason for the exclusion is that courts often 
treat due process challenges to local land use zoning decisions quite 
differently from review of other economic regulations.  Instead of a 
deferential rational basis test, where the regulation at issue is heavily 
presumed to be constitutional, courts often apply a mere “clear and 
convincing evidence” presumption when deciding land use zoning cases.58  
This is much less demanding than the traditional “rational-basis test.”59  
The affinity for applying economic substantive due process to land use 
zoning even extends to the federal courts.  Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not done so, many federal district and circuit courts, even in 
recent years, have overturned land use zoning decisions on Fourteenth 
Amendment economic substantive due process grounds.60  These decisions 
do apply the federal rational basis test, but nonetheless often result in the 
invalidation of the questioned regulation.61  Regarding this strange quirk in 
constitutional law, one commentator has noted that “federal courts have 
allowed economic substantive due process—an endangered species of 
constitutional doctrine—to escape extinction (and in some instances even 
to flourish) within the ecosystem that is land development law.”62  
Including land use zoning decisions in this study would therefore mix 
different doctrines together, similarly to including equal protection or 
takings cases.  It would not yield a representative account of recent trends 
                                                          
 58. See, e.g., La Salle Nat. Bank of Chi. v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ill. 
1957) (“A zoning ordinance is presumptively valid . . . this presumption may be overcome 
only by clear and convincing evidence.”) (citation omitted). 
 59. See, e.g., R.L. Jordan Co. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 
2000) (adopting the deferential standard of “[w]hether [the statute being challenged] bears a 
reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest of government” in all challenges to state 
statutes on substantive due process grounds). 
 60. See, e.g., Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming 
district court holding that town council’s refusal to issue a building permit for a 
condominium project was in violation of the property owner’s substantive due process 
rights); KDK Constr., Inc. v. E. Coventry Township Bd. of Supervisors, Civ. A. No. 95-925, 
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2516, at *12-*13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 1996) (holding that board of 
supervisors’ denial of a subdivision plan, which followed requirement that construction 
company post a cash escrow instead of a letter of credit, was arbitrary and in violation of 
substantive due process); see also Robert Ashbrook, Comment, Land Development, the 
Graham Doctrine, & the Extinction of Economic Substantive Due Process, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1255, 1257 (2002) (explaining that property owners have continued to make claims 
based on substantive due process rather than regulatory takings in land use cases because the 
prohibitively “strict ripeness requirements of regulatory takings claims” are not present in 
claims based on substantive due process). 
 61. See Ashbrook, supra note 60, at 1257-58 (noting that under the “Graham doctrine,” 
which is borrowed from constitutional criminal law, district courts have invalidated the 
substantive due process claims of land developers that challenge zoning and other 
regulations). 
 62. Id. at 1257. 
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in the doctrine of economic substantive due process. 
This is not to say that all “zoning” cases were excluded from this study.  
Just because a court or city council labels a regulation as “land use” or 
“zoning” does not mean it is a regulation that courts treat differently in 
economic substantive due process challenges.  For instance, included is the 
Pennsylvania case Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.63  
There, the local government sought to ban the operation of all quarries in a 
township.64  Such a total exclusion is more akin to a ban on the practice of 
a business65 than, for example, a decision to zone a plot of land as 
residential rather than commercial.66  Because these “zoning” decisions are 
more akin to economic substantive due process cases in the non-zoning 
arena, this study includes them.67 
II.  BACKGROUND:  THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCHNER AND HOW THE 
DOCTRINE SURVIVED IN STATE COURTS 
The roots of the story of economic substantive due process under state 
constitutional law trail back to the founding of the Republic and beyond.  
Rather than belabor a history already voluminously treated elsewhere in the 
literature, this Part notes only the essential highlights.68  It then provides an 
overview of economic substantive due process under state constitutional 
law since the New Deal, focusing on some aspects of economic life where 
state courts have been particularly active in applying the doctrine. 
A.  Early Protections of Economic Liberty and the Lochner Era 
American courts have long recognized the principle of judicial review in 
interpreting the economic policies of legislatures.69  In the years preceding 
                                                          
 63. 228 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1967). 
 64. Id. at 172. 
 65. See, e.g., Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 
1969) (holding that the absolute prohibition of “huckstering and peddling” is “arbitrary and 
unreasonable” and therefore invalid). 
 66. See, e.g., County of Lake v. MacNeal, 181 N.E.2d 85, 92, (Ill. 1962) (determining 
that zoning of lakeside property to be residential is not reasonably related to “the public 
health, safety, welfare or morals . . .”). 
 67. See, e.g., U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Res. Co. v. City of Beattyville, 548 
S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. 1977) (holding that a coal tipple may not be completely prohibited); 
State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. 1959) (striking down restrictions on the operation 
of junk yards on the grounds that the law was only justified on aesthetic grounds, and such 
grounds are not enough to invoke the police power), overruled by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 
675, 681 (N.C. 1982).  Also included in this study are cases involving state government (as 
opposed to local government) land use zoning regulations.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 
A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (holding that the denial of a permit under the state Wetlands Act 
violated substantive due process). 
 68. For general discussions of the Lochner era jurisprudence, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-86 (2d ed. 1988); GILLMAN, supra note 29, passim. 
 69. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating 
that it would offend “all justice and reason” to allow a legislature to take from A and give to 
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the Civil War, federal and state courts frequently used the Due Process 
Clauses, Takings Clause, Contracts Clause, or other provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Constitutions of the several states to strike down 
economic regulations that infringed upon the People’s economic liberties.70  
In the post-War era, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
Privileges or Immunities,71 Due Process,72 and Equal Protection73 Clauses 
greatly expanded the opportunity to protect these economic liberties.74  
Although the narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases75 in 1872 at first appeared to suggest that courts 
would not read the Fourteenth Amendment expansively to protect the 
American citizenry’s economic liberties,76 in 1887, the Supreme Court 
signaled a shift to an expansive reading of the Due Process Clause.77  The 
Court clarified its position in an 1897 case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana,78 
opening a forty-year period of regularly protecting economic liberties 
through a substantive reading of that Clause.79  The most famous of these 
opinions, Lochner v. New York,80 gave the period its name:  the Lochner 
era. 
                                                          
B).   
 70. See Paulsen, supra note 15, at 93 (“The doctrine of substantive due process was not 
invented in 1890 by the federal courts.  Clear traces of the concept can be found in state 
court opinions applying state constitutional provisions before the Civil War.”). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding a State from depriving “any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting a State from “deny[ing] to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 74. See Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 2-3 (1998) (discussing the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the resulting increased protection of many interests including speech, privacy, and 
religious freedom, as well as economic liberty). 
 75. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 76. Id. at 79-80 (finding that the “Privileges or Immunities” of American citizens are 
limited to rights such as the right to travel to the nation’s seat of government and the right to 
use navigable waters (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867))). 
 77. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887) (upholding the constitutionality 
of a Kansas liquor regulation, yet commenting at length in dicta that courts must 
independently determine whether economic legislation is a proper exercise of a state’s 
police power). 
 78. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).  The Allgeyer Court’s expansive definition of due process 
liberty stretched beyond mere protection from physical restraint.  Specifically, the Court 
included within its definition of liberty the freedom to live and work in any lawful vocation, 
and the right “to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential” to 
accomplishing these purposes.  Id. at 589. 
 79. See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 919-20 (1999) (discussing the Court’s use of economic substantive 
due process from the 1890s through the 1930s). 
 80. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (recognizing the individual economic and contractual liberty 
interests within the Due Process Clause and striking a New York law that limited the 
working hours of bakery employees as a violation of those interests). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court was not alone in this enterprise.  Various state 
supreme courts led the way in this post-Civil War endeavor, striking down 
economic regulations when the courts judged that they violated the 
economic liberties retained by the people and protected by state 
constitutions.81  Once the Lochner era was underway, the two levels of the 
judiciary worked hand-in-hand, with state courts protecting economic 
liberties through both the U.S. Constitution and their respective state 
constitutions.82 
Then, at least as abruptly as it began, the Lochner era came to an end.  In 
1934, while upholding a milk price-support law, the Court in Nebbia v. 
New York83 articulated that as long as a rational basis existed for an 
economic regulation, it was not its business to determine it 
unconstitutional.84  Then, in 1937, the Court signaled the end of its 
economic substantive due process review in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish85 
by concluding that it was within the state’s police power to enact minimum 
wage legislation.86  West Coast Hotel explicitly overruled the holding of 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,87 which had struck-down a minimum wage 
law for women,88 despite the Court’s reliance on Adkins only a year 
earlier.89  The Court has not struck down an economic regulation on 
                                                          
 81. See, e.g., Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631, 635-36 (Ill. 1886) (striking an Illinois 
requirement that coal-mining contracts be regulated by weight); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 
112-15 (1885) (invalidating restrictions on cigar making). 
 82. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 277-79 (1932) 
(invalidating a state-imposed ice vendor monopoly on federal Due Process grounds because 
the local ice market was not an industry of public use, and regulation of such a non-public 
enterprise violated individual contract rights); Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 
(1928) (striking down a pharmacy ownership restriction because financial control was not 
directly related to regulating public health); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 
525, 553-56 (1923) (employing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to invalidate a 
minimum wage law for women because it was not closely related to regulating the public 
interest, health, or morals); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (using the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to invalidate a law barring employers from forbidding 
their employees to join unions); State v. Goldstein, 93 So. 308, 314 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922) 
(holding a price-control measure in violation of the Alabama bill of rights and federal due 
process); State v. Legendre, 70 So. 70, 71 (La. 1915) (invalidating a limitation on fireman’s 
working hours under the Louisiana Constitution and the U.S. Constitution). 
 83. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 84. Id. at 510-11.  In adopting a rational basis test to review economic legislation, the 
Nebbia Court emphasized the fundamental importance of the state’s power to protect the 
public common interest.  Id. at 523-24.  According to the Court, the state’s interest in 
protecting the public from the harms of  individual contract abuse was “[e]qually 
fundamental with the private right [of economic liberty] . . . .”  Id. at 523.  Given the weight 
of this state interest, Nebbia held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clauses demand only that laws be reasonable—not arbitrary or capricious—and have a “real 
and substantial relation” to legislative goals.  Id. at 525. 
 85. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 86. Id. at 399-400. 
 87. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 88. Id. at 553-56. 
 89. One year before the West Coast Hotel decision, the Court invoked Adkins to strike 
down a minimum wage law for women and, for the last time, protected individual economic 
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substantive due process grounds since West Coast Hotel.90 
It was perhaps not immediately apparent after 1937 that this new 
deference would allow no practical opportunity to strike down economic 
regulations under a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause.91  After 
all, even if the new “rational basis” review made it harder to protect 
economic liberties, it was by no means an outlandish proposition to argue 
that such a possibility still existed.92  Soon, however, that view grew much 
harder to maintain.  In 1941, while upholding a Nebraska regulation 
limiting the price employment agencies may charge their customers, Justice 
Douglas announced for the Court:  “There is no necessity for the state to 
demonstrate before us that evils persist despite the competition which 
attends the bargaining in this field.”93  The only constitutional limits on the 
legislation were notions of policy, and “[s]ince [the policy notions did] not 
find expression in the Constitution, [the Court could not] give them 
continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the 
economic and social programs of the states [could] be determined.”94  
Following this black-and-white language,95 in the next two decades, and up 
through the present day, the Court has resisted any urge to revive the life of 
                                                          
liberty through substantive due process.  See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 
U.S. 587, 617-18 (1936) (noting that an amicus curiae brief argued that Adkins was 
unconstitutional and ought to be overruled, but ultimately confirming that Adkins’ holding—
that the “prescribing of minimum wages for women alone would unreasonably restrain them 
in competition with men and tend arbitrarily to deprive them of employment and a fair 
chance to find work”—was a sound interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 90. See Tussusov, supra note 18, at 536 (noting that the Supreme Court invalidated 
only one state economic regulation after 1937 and subsequently overruled that decision, and 
suggesting that the Court’s current position is a conclusive presumption that economic 
policy decisions of state legislatures are rational). 
 91. See Note, supra note 15, at 315 (arguing that some courts interpreted the rational 
basis analysis offered in Nebbia and West Coast Hotel as merely a more deferential level of 
scrutiny, rather than abandonment of economic substantive due process altogether); see also 
Ex parte Kazas, 70 P.2d 962, 964, 967-70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (drawing upon the 
reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court’s economic substantive due process decisions to strike 
down an ordinance that attempted to set minimum prices for local barbers and finding that 
the ordinance violated both the Federal and State Constitutions). 
 92. The Court has left open the possibility, however minimal, that it could invalidate an 
economic regulation if it truly were irrational.  See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 
483, 487-91 (1955) (considering at length the possible motivations of the legislature in 
passing an eyeglass sales regulation, suggesting that the Court would invalidate the 
legislation if it found that none of the motivations were rational).  But see Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (refusing to examine the motivation of the Kansas 
legislature in passing business regulations).  The Court has continued to leave open the 
possibility of invalidating an economic regulation under rational basis review, and has 
elected to follow the method of Lee Optical, not the hands-off method of Ferguson.  
Sanders, supra note 22, at 672-73. 
 93. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). 
 94. Id. at 246-47. 
 95. According to one commentator, after such a statement, “[s]tate courts could no 
longer legitimately claim that any form of trade regulation violated fourteenth amendment 
[sic] due process . . . .”  Note, supra note 15, at 316. 
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Lochner.96  Instead, it has emphatically concluded that the Court will not sit 
as a “superlegislature” in judging the wisdom of economic regulations.97 
B.  Persistence in the State Courts after the Lochner Era 
For whatever reason, the state courts did not get the memo.  From 1937 
to the present, state courts have continued to protect economic liberty by 
applying substantive due process to economic regulations.  In addition to 
utilizing the various constitutional methods discussed earlier,98 state courts 
have often concluded that a regulation violates the U.S. Constitution as 
well.99  They have done so even after the Supreme Court made it crystal 
clear that this would constitute an incorrect application of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 
1. The inability of state courts to let go 
Although this Article concerns state constitutional law, it is worth briefly 
reviewing state court use of the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting 
economic liberty since 1940.101  Quite commonly, constitutional litigation 
in state court considers whether a statute violates one or both of the state 
and U.S. Constitutions.102  If a state court concludes that a law violates both 
constitutions, as they often have in the decades following 1937, there exists 
a presumption that the case may not be appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.103  As long as invalidation under an economic substantive due 
                                                          
 96. See Tussusov, supra note 18, at 536 (stating that “modern due process challenges to 
state regulation of labor, price fixing, and business practices” have enjoyed almost no 
success before the Supreme Court) (footnotes omitted). 
 97. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731-32 (noting that challengers’ arguments about the social 
utility of economic regulation should be addressed to the legislature, rather than the courts). 
 98. See supra Part I.A (discussing the use of state constitutional due process, takings, 
and contract clauses to evaluate the validity of economic regulations). 
 99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing examples of state court 
decisions finding that economic regulations violate the federal Due Process Clause). 
 100. See infra Part II.B.2.a (describing state court invalidation of fair trade acts after the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that such acts did not violate economic substantive 
due process). 
 101. A review of state court interpretation of the Federal Constitution is especially 
informative because state courts have often based interpretations of state constitutional 
provisions on analogous federal precedent.  See Kirby, supra note 9, at 243-44 (pointing to 
state courts’ heavy reliance on federal substantive due process precedent, rather than 
independent interpretation of state constitutions).  The relevant language of the Federal 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 102. State courts more frequently review state and federal constitutional provisions 
because parties often raise both types of constitutional arguments or defenses.  See Kirby, 
supra note 9, at 242-43 (“[C]onstitutional challenges to economic regulations can be, and 
usually are, made on both state and federal constitutional grounds.”). 
 103. See id. at 243-44 (noting that state courts often decide a case based on both federal 
and state constitutional grounds, because the state court can insulate its decision from 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court as long as the decision has an adequate and independent 
basis in the state constitution); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text (citing 
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process theory is supported by “adequate and independent” state 
constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court may not review such a state 
court decision.104  Therefore, state courts are generally insulated in 
concluding that an economic regulation violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause as long as the court makes a similar 
conclusion under the state constitution’s due process provision.105 
These insulated holdings give us a glimpse into the mindset of state 
judges in the years following the close of the Lochner era.  Many of these 
cases relied upon the most “infamous” Lochner era opinions, including 
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,106 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,107 and even 
                                                          
numerous examples of state cases striking economic regulations on federal, as well as state, 
constitutional grounds).  Even where state courts have improperly applied federal due 
process standards, chances of reversal by the Supreme Court are low because state supreme 
courts have final and ultimate authority to interpret their respective state constitutions.  See 
Kirby, supra note 9, at 244 (describing federal appellate review of state decisions as “merely 
advisory because state courts remain the ultimate arbiters of state law”); Tussasov, supra 
note 18, at 529-30 & n.6 (discussing the “presumption of independence” given to states 
when interpreting their own constitutions, even when such provisions mimic federal 
constitutional provisions). 
 104. See Jankovich v. Ind. Toll Rd. Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (reaffirming that 
when a state court decision relies on analogous provisions in both the state and Federal 
Constitutions, the court’s interpretation of the state constitution provides “an independent 
and adequate ground of decision” that deprives the Supreme Court of the authority to review 
the judgment); cf. Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (recognizing the possibility of 
Supreme Court review where a state court strikes a law under its own constitution but “it is 
not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent 
state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on 
federal law”); Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 & n.6 (discussing briefly the history of the 
“adequate and independent” doctrine, and the implication of the Long decision on the 
application and efficacy of that doctrine). 
 105. See Tussasov, supra note 18, at 529-30 (claiming that state courts are “well aware 
that their decisions can be shielded from federal review” by asserting that the decision is 
based on adequate and independent state constitutional grounds); Kirby, supra note 9, at 
243-44 (describing the common state court practice of avoiding federal court review by 
“summarily indicating that invalidation . . . is also required under the state constitution.”). 
 106. 278 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1928) (invalidating a state statute requiring all pharmacies to 
be owned by licensed pharmacists because the regulation created an “unreasonable and 
unnecessary restriction upon private business”).  Post-1940 cases relying on Liggett include 
City of Denver v. Thrailkill, 244 P.2d 1074, 1080-81 (Colo. 1952) (citing Liggett as 
recognizing owners’ property interest in their businesses, and invalidating an ordinance 
regulating taxi ownership and licensing under due process) and Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 
108 N.E.2d 629, 635 (Ind. 1952) (striking a statute fixing the resale price for automobile 
financing contracts because, under Liggett, there was no substantial relation to public 
welfare where the public interest was adequately protected by other provisions of the law). 
 107. 285 U.S. 262, 271, 277 (1932) (invalidating a statute requiring individuals who 
manufactured, sold, or distributed ice within the state to obtain a license because the 
regulation unreasonably interfered with lawful, private business activities).  Post-1940 cases 
relying on New State Ice include In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 
S.E.2d 729, 735 (N.C. 1973) (distinguishing hospital operations, constitutionally regulated 
under the public use doctrine, from the hospital’s business administration, the regulation of 
which had no substantial relation to protecting the public interest as required by due 
process) and General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956) (striking the non-
signer clause of a fair trade act as interfering with individual contract rights protected by due 
process). 
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Lochner itself.108  State judges knew, of course, about the renunciation of 
the reasoning in these cases in opinions such as West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish,109 Olsen v. Nebraska,110 Williamson v. Lee Optical,111 and 
Ferguson v. Skrupa.112  It appears, however, that they just did not care.  
They relied on these Lochner era precedents not just as persuasive authority 
in interpreting their own state constitutions, but in interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment.113  In case after case, state courts played the part 
of an ostrich, burying their heads in the pages of pre-1937 case reporters 
and proceeding as though these Lochner-era precedents were still “good 
law” in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.114 
But under state constitutions, good law they often were.  As discussed in 
more detail below, in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the highest courts of 
appeal in almost every state struck down state statutes and local ordinances 
on economic substantive due process grounds.115  The number of cases in 
which a state supreme court protected economic liberty through substantive 
due process in the 1950s actually exceeded—far and away exceeded—the 
number of similar cases in the 1940s.116  Although the volume of these 
cases declined in the 1960s, state courts in that decade employed the 
doctrine in roughly the same number of cases as courts had in the 1940s.117  
Thus, thirty years after the U.S. Supreme Court had emphatically stated 
                                                          
 108. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).  Post-1940 cases relying on Lochner include Edwards v. 
State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 231 P.2d 450, 453 (Ariz. 1951) and State Bd. of Barber 
Examiners v. Cloud, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980 (Ind. 1942). 
 109. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  For further discussion of West Coast Hotel, see supra notes 
85-90 and accompanying text. 
 110. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 247 (1941) 
(finding that economic substantive due process “does not find expression in the 
Constitution” and stating that it should not be used to evaluate economic and social 
judgments made by the states). 
 111. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  For further discussion of 
Williamson, see supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 112. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).  For further discussion of Ferguson, see supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (citing state court cases in which state 
courts relied on state and Federal Constitutions to strike down economic legislation). 
 114. See infra Part II.B.2 (noting that state courts in the post-Lochner era have been 
particularly active in applying substantive due process in cases involving “fair trade acts, 
advertising restrictions, price controls, occupational licensing, and Sunday closing.”). 
 115. See infra Part II.B.2; see also infra Appendix A (listing economic substantive due 
process cases since 1940 by state). 
 116. See infra Appendix B (indicating that state supreme courts handed down ninety-six 
decisions based on economic substantive due process in the 1950s, compared with sixty-
eight decisions in the 1940s). 
 117. See infra Appendix B (indicating that sixty-seven state supreme court decisions 
based on economic substantive due process were handed down in the 1960s).  In 1963 a 
commentator could confidently (and, at that time, correctly) assert that, “[t]he increasing 
frequency of [economic substantive due process] decisions indicates that economic due 
process is neither dead nor dying and that it is the United States Supreme Court, rather than 
the state courts, which is resisting the current drift in constitutional interpretation.”  Note, 
supra note 15, at 321. 
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that it was not in the business of protecting economic liberties through 
economic substantive due process,118 the supreme courts of many states 
either ignored or openly thumbed their nose at the new jurisprudence of the 
highest court in the land.119 
This level of defiance did not last forever, although it continues today at 
a much-diminished frequency.  The number of cases where state supreme 
courts protected economic liberties through applying economic substantive 
due process in the 1970s fell considerably when compared to the 1960s, 
and by the 1980s only a handful of states invalidated economic regulations 
on substantive due process grounds, and then, only on occasion.120  Some 
states repudiated their earlier adherence to Lochner-era protections of 
economic liberties,121 while in others a heightened degree of protection still 
stands as good law, but is rarely called upon.122  For reasons that are a bit 
unclear, the adherence to Lochner-era protection of economic liberties 
could not sustain itself at such a strong level for more than three decades 
after West Coast Hotel.123 
Although the level of protection afforded by state courts since 1937 has 
greatly exceeded that of the modern U.S. Supreme Court, there are few 
examples of state supreme courts striking down economic regulations with 
the frequency and regularity of the Lochner era Supreme Court.  Although 
scholars have greatly inflated the “activism” of the pre-1937 Court over the 
years,124 the Court regularly struck down economic regulations on 
substantive due process grounds at the rate of just over one per year.125  
                                                          
 118. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text (tracing the decline of the Lochner 
era in the Supreme Court). 
 119. See infra Part III (providing a detailed, state-by-state discussion of economic 
substantive due process by the supreme courts of Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, and South Carolina). 
 120. See infra Appendix B (indicating that state supreme courts decided sixty-seven 
cases involving economic substantive due process during the 1960s, forty-eight during the 
1970s, and eleven during the 1980s). 
 121. For a discussion of state supreme courts that have refused to apply economic 
substantive due process since 1980, see infra Part III.B (highlighting examples from 
Indiana, Massachusetts, and South Carolina).  For a more detailed study of the curtailment 
of Lochner-style economic substantive due process in one state, see David Smith, Economic 
Substantive Due Process in Arizona:  A Survey, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 327, 341 (1988) 
(highlighting the Arizona Supreme Court’s adoption of a rational basis test in examining 
economic substantive due process claims, and arguing that this change constituted a 
“marked divergence” from the court’s traditional approach in such cases). 
 122. See infra Part III.A (examining the status of economic substantive due process in 
several states that actively applied the doctrine until the 1980s and used the doctrine less 
frequently after that time). 
 123. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 124. See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due 
Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1080 (1997) (finding that the number of 
regulations invalidated by the Supreme Court under “true” economic substantive due 
process during the Lochner era was a total of fifty-five, not 200, as had been claimed 
elsewhere). 
 125. The rate of approximately one case per year is based on Phillips’ conclusion that the 
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Since 1940, only the 1950s Florida Supreme Court has approached that 
level of activity.126 
2.  Areas of protection extended under state economic substantive due 
process 
Since 1940,127 state supreme courts have used economic substantive due 
process to protect economic liberty in all manner of areas of economic life.  
The examples range from bans on frog gigging128 to price controls on 
cigarettes.129  The reach of the cases is so wide-ranging that it is difficult to 
categorize all of them into discrete subject areas.  Nevertheless, a few 
subjects stand out.  To gain a full appreciation for the breadth and impact of 
the material underlying the trends discussed in Part III, the remainder of 
this Section outlines a few areas where state courts have been particularly 
active in applying the doctrine of economic substantive due process.  These 
areas are state fair trade acts, advertising restrictions, price controls, 
occupational licensing, and Sunday closing laws. 
a.  Fair trade acts 
More than any other area, the state court treatment of fair trade acts 
stands out as an example of the “New Judicial Federalism” in the economic 
substantive due process arena.  Legislation generally known as “fair trade 
acts” allowed suppliers of goods “sold under a trademark, trade name, or 
brand name to regulate by contract the price at which their products were 
sold at retail.”130  What often undermined the acts’ constitutionality was the 
inclusion of a “non-signer clause,” which allowed suppliers to sue a seller 
                                                          
Court decided fifty-five “true” economic substantive due process cases during the forty-year 
Lochner period, which lasted from 1897 until 1937.  Id. 
 126. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s active use of 
economic substantive due process as compared to other state supreme courts during the 
same time period). 
 127. This article explores state court use of economic substantive due process beginning 
in 1940, and does not attempt to comment on use of the doctrine in state courts before this 
time. 
 128. See City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (La. 1978) (declaring that 
an eleven-month ban on frog gigging had no rational relationship to protecting the public 
interest, and thus violated economic substantive due process).  The Curry court described 
frog gigging as “a method of taking frogs with a mechanical device . . . while in a boat close 
to the shore line . . . [which . . . essentially] grabs or “gigs” the frog but does not puncture 
the frog’s skin or redden its meat.”  Id. at 1079 n.1. 
 129. See Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91-93 (Ohio 1947) (striking down 
an Ohio statute that attempted to set minimum cigarette prices because the statute’s failure 
to account for different operating costs amongst cigarette wholesalers effectively 
discriminated against one wholesaler in favor of another and therefore violated substantive 
due process). 
 130. Robert H. Jerry, II & Reginald L. Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the 
Negotiation of Insurance Agent Commissions:  Substantive Due Process Review Under 
State Constitutions, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 802-03 (1990). 
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for trading at less than contract price, even if the seller was not a party to 
the contract.131  In 1936, in the twilight of the Lochner era, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld Illinois’ fair trade act as constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.132  However, between 1940 and 1975, after 
Congress amended the Sherman Act to once again prohibit fair trade 
acts,133 at least twenty-one state supreme courts struck down such acts on 
state economic substantive due process grounds.134  Interestingly, the 
history of judicial invalidation of fair trade acts is evidence of the 
acceleration of economic substantive due process under state constitutional 
law even as the country moved away from the New Deal.  By 1956, only 
four states had declared such legislation unconstitutional under economic 
substantive due process;135 by 1975, that number had grown 
                                                          
 131. See id. at 803 (describing non-signer clauses and noting that many state courts 
invalidated fair trade laws on the ground that the clause violated due process under the state 
constitution). Even though not a signer, the reseller would have to have knowledge of the 
contract to be liable under a fair trade law.  See Howard, supra note 15, at 883 n.46. 
 132. See Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 191-92 
(1936) (acknowledging that established economic substantive due process doctrine 
prohibited “legislative price fixing” covering an entire industry but concluding that the fair 
trade act did not violate that doctrine because it simply enabled parties to fix prices of 
identified goods in a contract). 
 133. Originally, the Supreme Court concluded that contracts between wholesalers and 
retailers fixing the price of goods sold to consumers were a “restraint of trade” and violated 
the Sherman Act.  Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400, 407-
09 (1911).  Much later, Congress amended the law to allow states to provide for such 
contracts.  Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975).  In 
1975, Congress changed its mind, and re-enacted the prohibition against retail price-fixing 
contracts.  Consumer Goods Pricing Act, 89 Stat. 801 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (2004)).  See generally Jerry & Robinson, supra note 130, at 802-03 
(discussing historical treatment of anti-trust laws in Congress). 
 134. Prior studies contend that a full majority of state supreme courts have invalidated 
fair trade laws since 1936.  Howard, supra note 15, at 883 & n.48 (citing 2 TRADE REG. REP. 
(CCH) ¶ 6041 (Mar. 15, 1976)).  The following cases support such an assessment of state 
court action.  For more individualized information regarding each case, see infra Appendix 
A.  See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So. 2d 797, 799 (Ala. 1962); 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 275 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Ark. 1955); 
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139, 152 (Colo. 1956); Miles Labs., Inc. 
v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954); Cox v. Gen. Elec. Co., 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ga. 
1955); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Coop., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. 1958); Opinion of 
the Justices, 132 A.2d 47, 49 (Me. 1957); Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & 
Tobacco Co., 12 A.2d 201, 207 (Md. 1940); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop 
Sporting Goods Co., 54 N.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Mich. 1952); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 
v. Skaggs Drug Ctr., Inc., 359 P.2d 644, 654 (Mont. 1961); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & 
Smith Drug Co., 68 N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955); Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch 
Co., 396 P.2d 683, 693 (Nev. 1964); Skaggs Drug Ctr. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 P.2d 967, 974 
(N.M. 1957); Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141, 
151 (N.C. 1974); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 147 N.E.2d 481, 484 
(Ohio 1958); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297, 303 (Okla. 1961); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956); Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 
72 (Pa. 1940); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 99 S.E.2d 665, 672 (S.C. 1957); 
Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wa. 1959); Gen. Elec. Co. v. A. 
Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W.Va. 1958); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale 
Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 420-21 (Wyo. 1962). 
 135. See Howard, supra note 15, at 883 (noting that seventeen states had upheld fair 
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exponentially.136 
b.  Advertising restrictions 
Almost as many state supreme courts have used economic substantive 
due process to invalidate state restrictions on advertising, particularly the 
advertising of prices.  State courts decided most of the relevant cases before 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment protects 
commercial speech.137  Today, state courts would find many of the 
regulations at issue in these cases unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment and can avoid the “Lochner label” by instead applying the 
commercial speech doctrine.138  The pre-commercial speech cases 
themselves usually involved very little discussion, if any, of free speech; 
instead, they emphasized property rights and the arbitrariness of 
governmental power.139  At least fifteen state supreme courts have struck 
down advertising regulations since 1940 on state economic substantive due 
process grounds.140  Many involve whether gas stations may advertise 
                                                          
trade acts under their state constitutions during the same time period). 
 136. See id. (observing that “far more states have struck down fair trade laws than have 
upheld them” since 1956); see also supra note 134 (listing twenty-two state high court 
decisions that struck down fair trade laws on substantive due process grounds by 1975, 
representing more than a five-fold increase in approximately thirty-five years). 
 137. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976) (recognizing the importance of commercial speech and advertising and 
finding that speech does not lose First Amendment protection because money is spent to 
promote it or because it is “carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit”). 
 138. Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (applying the commercial speech doctrine, which demands a 
“substantial” governmental interest to justify a regulation of advertising), with Stadnik v. 
Shell’s City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962) (striking down a regulation banning the 
advertising of prescription drugs because it had no “reasonable justification” and lacked any 
basis in protecting public health).  Had Central Hudson been available to the Stadnik court, 
it would not have had to justify the invalidation of the regulation by using the substantive 
due process rational basis test, which gives more deference to the state’s interest. 
 139. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So. 2d 747, 749 (La. 1964) (striking a law 
limiting the size of gasoline price advertising signs by stressing the arbitrary and unrelated 
connection between the restriction and the state’s asserted interest in fraud prevention); 
Levy v. Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951) (striking a similar restriction on the size 
of gasoline price signs, stating that “[t]he ordinance bears no reasonable relation whatsoever 
to public peace, health, morals, welfare or safety.”) (emphasis added). 
 140. See, e.g., Ala. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n v. McDowell, 6 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 
1942); Mott’s Super Markets, Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961); State v. 
Hobson, 83 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Del. 1951); State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So. 2d 
19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958); Needham v. Proffitt, 41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942); Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. City of New Orleans, 117 So. 2d 64, 66 (La. 1960); United Interchange, Inc. of 
Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1958); Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 
311 A.2d 242, 252 (Md. 1973); Levy, 49 N.W.2d at 82-83; State v. Redman Petroleum 
Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 845, 846 (Nev. 1961); State v. Boston Juvenile Shoes, 288 A.2d 7, 11 
(N.J. 1972); Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941); Little Pep Delmonico Rest., 
Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 113 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C. 1960), overruled by State v. Jones, 290 
S.E.2d 675, 679-82 (N.C. 1982); Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490, 
495 (Pa. 1971); Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 1962).  For 
more information regarding the facts and holdings of these cases, see infra Appendix A. 
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prices,141 and several others concern advertising by specific occupations.142 
c.  Price controls 
Invalidating regulations on prices, whether in striking down minimum 
wage laws143 or in nullifying price supports for commodities,144 was a 
bread-and-butter practice of the Lochner-era Court.  Unsurprisingly, such 
behavior has also characterized state constitutional protection of economic 
liberties since 1940.  At least nineteen state supreme courts have concluded 
that certain controls on prices violate economic substantive due process 
under their respective state constitutions.145  The U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded in Nebbia v. New York146 that price supports are constitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as long as they are 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.147  In concluding 
otherwise under their own constitutions, state courts have often ignored 
                                                          
 141. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 12 A.2d 192, 194 (Conn. 1940) (concluding that a 
prohibition on gas station price signs has no “appreciable effect” of protecting the public 
from fraud and is therefore unconstitutional); Walters, 104 So. 2d at 20-21 (reaching the 
same conclusion); Pride Oil Co., 370 P.2d at 356-57 (concluding that a restriction on 
placement of gas price signs violates the right to own and enjoy property). 
 142. See, e.g., Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A.2d 152, 158 (Conn. 1954) (striking down 
restrictions on dental advertising as bearing no reasonable relation to the public welfare); 
Needham, 41 N.E.2d at 607 (concluding that limiting the ability of funeral directors and 
embalmers to advertise is unconstitutional); Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d at 18 (holding that a ban 
on advertising barber service prices interferes with property rights). 
 143. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609-11 (1936) 
(upholding a state statute prescribing a minimum wage for women workers and noting that 
the Court had found that “statutes fixing rates and charges to be exacted by businesses 
impressed with a public interest, relating to contracts for the performance of public work, 
prescribing the character, methods and time of payment of wages, [and] fixing hours of 
labor” did not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 144. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (striking a 
gasoline price-control measure by applying the general rule that states may not regulate 
commodity prices, except where such commodities are “affected with a public interest”). 
 145. See Ports Petroleum Co. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark. 1996); 
Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 231 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Ariz. 1951); State Bd. of 
Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 254 P.2d 29, 36 (Cal. 1953); Frassinelli, 172 
A.2d at 386; Batton-Jackson Oil Co. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ga. 1986); Dep’t of 
Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 
339 P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959); Remote Servs., Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 
1989); City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So. 2d 747, 749 (La. 1964); Wiley v. Sampson-
Ripley Co., 120 A.2d 289, 291 (Me. 1956); Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 
N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 
221 (Neb. 1974); Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947); Englebrecht 
v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 1949); Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 
S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967), overruled by R.L. Jordan Co. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 
527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000); San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 
813 (Tex. 1957); State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965), overruled by 
Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 
(W.Va. 1984).  For more information about the facts and holdings of these cases, see infra 
Appendix A. 
 146. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 147. Id. at 525. 
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Nebbia, sometimes explicitly adopting the reasoning of Justice 
McReynolds’ dissenting opinion in that decision.148  This is not to say that 
state courts have brazenly invalidated price controls across the board.  For 
example, in many of the cases involving prohibitions on sales below cost—
the sale of an item for less than its original purchase price—courts have 
carefully held that sales below cost may be made illegal, but only when the 
seller has the “predatory intent” to undermine a competitor.149 
d.  Occupational licensing 
More than in any other field, except perhaps for review of local land use 
regulation,150 state courts in the post-Lochner era have utilized economic 
substantive due process to protect the right to make a living.  State supreme 
courts have invalidated licensing laws outright (including those extending 
exclusive monopolies or completely banning certain professions),151 or 
have determined them to be too restrictive because they require 
unreasonable prerequisites in order to gain a license.152  Overall, thirty state 
supreme courts, three-fifths of the several states, have protected the right to 
make a living through nullifying licensing or pseudo-licensing laws.153  
                                                          
 148. See, e.g., Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 678 (S.C. 1960) (agreeing with and 
adopting the reasoning of the Nebbia dissent that prices may only be regulated if the 
industry is affected with the public interest (citing Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539-59 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting) (advocating a return to a strict application of the “affected with 
the public interest” standard when judging the constitutionality of price-fixing 
regulations))), overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., 527 S.E.2d at 765. 
 149. See, e.g., Ports Petroleum Co., 916 S.W.2d at 755-56 (striking down an Arkansas 
anti-predatory pricing law that failed to require a showing of predatory intent); Anderson, 
339 P.2d at 18 (declaring unconstitutional a Kansas milk sales law criminalizing sales below 
cost even when the seller lacked intent to sell below cost); Englebrecht, 208 P.2d at 544 
(striking down an Oklahoma law banning below-cost sales because the law included sales 
made without intent to harm competitors). 
 150. As explained above, the invalidation of local land use decisions are not included in 
this study.  See supra Part I.B (stating that local land use cases are not used in the study 
because courts often employ a different standard of review in these cases than in traditional 
economic substantive due process cases). 
 151. See, e.g., N. Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54-
55 (Ark. 1944) (striking down a taxi licensing scheme as a violation of state constitution’s 
anti-monopoly clause and briefly mentioning that the licensing scheme constitutes a blatant 
abuse of the state’s police power). 
 152. See, e.g., Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo. 1961) (concluding that a 
licensing scheme requiring funeral directors to be qualified embalmers, which requires 
additional education, is beyond the police power because it is an arbitrary, unrelated, and 
unnecessary requirement). 
 153. See, e.g., Lisenba v. Griffin, 8 So. 2d 175, 177 (Ala. 1942) (finding a barbering 
licensing ordinance unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate a legitimate, private 
business); Buehman v. Bechtel, 114 P.2d 227, 232 (Ariz. 1941) (finding a photographer 
licensing regulation unconstitutional because it prevented “competent” individuals from 
pursuing a legitimate occupation); N. Little Rock Transp. Co., 184 S.W.2d at 53-54 
(applying the anti-monopoly clause in the state constitution to strike down provisions in a 
taxi licensing statute); Abdoo v. City & County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 1964) 
(striking down a photographer licensing scheme as an improper invasion of constitutional 
freedoms); Hart v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942) (ruling 
SANDERS OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:00:52 PM 
2005] THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS TIME 483 
Many courts did so in the 1940s, perhaps believing that the Lochner era 
had not drawn to a close, but examples present themselves through the 
present day.154 
                                                          
that a licensing scheme for funeral directors was unconstitutional because it granted an 
“exclusive privilege” to one class of applicants); Sullivan v. DeCerb, 23 So. 2d 571, 572 
(Fla. 1945) (declaring that a photographer licensing scheme violated the state constitution); 
Berry v. Summers, 283 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho 1955) (deciding that a requiring dental 
technicians to be licensed as dentists was unreasonable); Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 
580 (Ill. 1995) (concluding that a licensing scheme for private alarm contractors violated the 
state constitution); City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1942) (ruling that an 
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door sales unreasonably regulated salesmen); Delight 
Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 1969) (invalidating an 
absolute prohibition on “huckstering and peddling” as arbitrary and unreasonable); City of 
Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Ky. 1941) (ruling that an 
ordinance restricting the activities of door-to-door salesmen was arbitrary and 
unreasonable); City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1986) (striking down 
an ordinance that limited the type of work journeyman plumbers could perform as an 
inappropriate exercise of police power); Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 
1948) (stating that a proposed bill preventing cemetery owners from selling cemetery 
monuments would be an unreasonable exercise of the police power); Moore v. Grillis, 39 
So. 2d 505, 512 (Miss. 1949) (ruling that a law preventing unlicensed public accountants 
from preparing tax returns was not reasonably related to goals of protecting public welfare); 
State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530, 533-34 (Mont. 1954) (finding that a photography licensing 
board that has sole and arbitrary power to choose qualified photographers violates due 
process); Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 291 N.W. 664, 670 (Neb. 1940) (asserting that 
an ordinance preventing door-to-door sales encroached on an individual’s right to engage in 
lawful business); State v. Moore, 13 A.2d 143, 148 (N.H. 1940) (determining that a truck 
licensing scheme was an arbitrary restriction on a lawful business); N.J. Good Humor, Inc. 
v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bradley Beach, 11 A.2d 113, 117 (N.J. 1940) (ruling that an 
ordinance that prevents peddling for the benefit of local merchants is an abuse of the police 
power); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1943) (striking 
down an anti-peddling ordinance that had no reasonable relation to the public welfare); 
Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957) (overturning a statute authorizing  a board 
to have the exclusive right to license tile contractors as arbitrarily interfering with private 
business); State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 (N.D. 1943) (determining that a 
photographer licensing law unreasonably interfered with the right to engage in business); 
Frecker v. Dayton, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ohio 1950) (determining that an ordinance 
preventing the sale of certain foods on the street is void absent a real relationship to public 
welfare); Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 
1971) (ruling that psychologist licensing procedures were unreasonably restrictive); Hertz 
Corp. v. Heltzel, 341 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Or. 1959) (invalidating a statute regulating the rental 
of delivery vehicles as furthering a monopoly in violation of the constitution); Olan Mills, 
Inc. v. Sharon, 92 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. 1952) (striking down an ordinance imposing a tax on 
transient retail photographic businesses as an improper use of police power); City of Rapid 
City v. Schmitt, 71 N.W.2d 297, 298 (S.D. 1955) (holding that an ordinance that restricted 
plumbing permits only to plumbing contractors violated due process); Livesay v. Tenn. Bd. 
of Exam’rs in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tenn. 1959) (declaring that a statute 
regulating the occupation of watchmakers encroached on the right to pursue an occupation 
in a valid field); Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Vill. of St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188, 196-97 (Vt. 
1943) (ruling that an ordinance licensing junk businesses was an abuse of the police power); 
Moore v. Sutton, 39 S.E.2d 348, 350-51 (Va. 1946) (deciding that a photographic licensing 
statute infringed on the right to earn a living); Thorne v. Roush, 261 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W.Va. 
1979) (determining that a statute regulating junior barbers curtailed individual liberty and 
violated substantive due process). 
 154. See, e.g., Church, 646 N.E.2d at 580 (determining that a private alarm contractor 
licensing scheme was unconstitutional as an invalid use of the police power); Nixon v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003) (concluding that a law restricting 
recently released criminals from working in nursing homes “unconstitutionally infringes on 
SANDERS OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:00:52 PM 
484 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:457 
e.  Sunday closing laws 
Whereas the invalidation of many advertising restrictions by state courts 
under economic substantive due process review presaged the U.S. Supreme 
Court invalidating many such restrictions under the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause,155 the invalidation of Sunday closing laws by many 
state courts has occurred in spite of the Supreme Court’s refusal to strike 
down such laws as per se violations of the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause.156  The Supreme Court has held that a legislature 
may mandate a uniform day of rest as long as it is for a secular purpose and 
does not substantially burden religion.157  Ten state supreme courts, 
however, often not looking at whether the law possesses a religious 
purpose, have struck down Sunday closing laws as unreasonable and 
anticompetitive.158  This is an area of economic substantive due process 
that has weathered the passage of time much better than others, as several 
cases were decided in recent decades.159 
III.  WHICH STATES HAVE ENFORCED ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE                
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND WHEN 
As stated above, and set forth in detail in the Appendices, the persistence 
                                                          
the Employees’ right to pursue an occupation”). 
 155. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing cases in which state supreme courts have 
invalidated advertising restrictions). 
 156. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion) (ruling that a 
Sunday closing law does not violate the Establishment Clause because it advances secular 
goals by providing a day of rest for all citizens and only incidentally burdening religion). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Handy Dan Imp. Ctr., Inc. v. Adams, 633 S.W.2d 699, 702-03 (Ark. 1982) 
(ruling that a Sunday closing law that lists general categories of prohibited items is too 
vague for men of common intelligence to follow and violates due process); Fair Cadillac-
Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08 (Conn. 1994) (striking down a 
statute that prevented car sales on Sunday as arbitrary and only affecting one class of 
employment); Rogers v. State, 199 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964) (invalidating a statute 
prohibiting barbering on Sundays as an unreasonable restriction on private business); Moore 
v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961) (ruling against a statute prohibiting used car 
sales on Sundays because there was no “valid and substantial reason” for regulating this 
particular business); West v. Town of Winnsboro, 211 So. 2d 665, 672 (La. 1967) 
(overturning an ordinance preventing some grocery stores from operating on Sundays but 
not other grocery stores); Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964) 
(rejecting a Sunday closing law that exempted businesses employing not more than two 
people and trade shows); State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293, 299 (N.C. 1965) (striking down a 
Sunday closing law for clubs within 300 yards of schools as unreasonable because schools 
are not in session during the time specified in the law); Spartan’s Indus., Inc. v. Oklahoma 
City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 1972) (ruling that a Sunday closing law affecting some 
discount stores is an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power); Dodge Town v. 
Romney, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1971) (reasoning that there is no legitimate reason related 
to public welfare for banning car sales on Sundays); Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 
431, 437 (Wyo. 1964) (ruling that an ordinance that allowed the sale of some items on 
Sundays provided they were separate from the prohibited items as capricious and arbitrary). 
 159. See, e.g., Handy Dan, 633 S.W.2d at 703 (invalidating a Sunday closing law in 
1982); Fair Cadillac, 640 A.2d at 107-08 (overturning a Sunday closing law in 1994). 
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of economic substantive due process review under state constitutional law 
in state supreme courts during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s is quite 
astonishing considering such review was all but nominally abandoned by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  As Appendix B illustrates, in the 1940s state 
courts of highest review invalidated economic regulations sixty-eight times 
under economic substantive due process.  In the 1950s this number grew to 
ninety-six instances.160  This was in the face of the continued, and 
relentless, insistence of the U.S. Supreme Court that it was no longer in the 
business of economic substantive due process.161  In the 1960s the numbers 
fell, but only back to the level of the 1940s, with sixty-seven such instances 
according to the research underlying this study.162  What is more, the court 
of highest review of every state except Alaska, Hawaii, and Rhode Island 
utilized economic substantive due process to protect economic liberties 
during the period from 1940 to 1969.163  Even these three omissions are 
misleading because Alaska and Hawaii only gained statehood in 1959, and 
1960, respectively.164  Rhode Island, although it has refused to interpret its 
due process clause to provide substantive protections to non-criminal 
defendants,165 invalidated a state statute on at least one occasion through 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.166 
Although no study before this one attempted a comprehensive review of 
all state supreme court economic substantive due process cases during the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s,167 prior studies provide extensive analysis of this 
period and of why the state courts hung onto economic substantive due 
process for such a long time.168  The excellence of those studies 
                                                          
 160. See infra Appendix B. 
 161. See supra Part II.A-B (tracing the rise and fall of the Lochner era in the Supreme 
Court and discussing specific cases in which state supreme courts continued to apply 
substantive due process despite the Court’s abandonment of the doctrine). 
 162. See infra Appendix B. 
 163. See infra Appendix B. 
 164. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 1, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958); Hawaii 
Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 1, 73 Stat. 4, 4 (1959). 
 165. See Sepe v. Daneker, 68 A.2d 101, 105-06 (R.I. 1949) (refusing to invalidate 
restrictions on the sale of liquor as the due process clause in the Rhode Island Constitution is 
construed narrowly and only applies to criminal defendants). 
 166. See Haigh v. State Bd. of Hairdressing, 72 A.2d 674, 677-78 (R.I. 1952) (using the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down an arbitrary statute prohibiting hairdressers from 
advertising fees). 
 167. One study alludes to research of how many times a state court of highest review 
struck down economic regulations through economic substantive due process, but the article 
does not include the specific cases from each state, and includes a different time-period 
from the period analyzed here.  See Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges to 
Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215, 222-23 (1989) (analyzing the 
use of substantive due process evaluations by state courts as a marker of judicial 
independence from the political branches of government). 
 168. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 18 (referring to a study that focused on economic 
substantive due process in cases involving healthcare regulations and a study that focused 
on the application of economic substantive due process by New York courts). 
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notwithstanding, no study that has come to the Author’s attention analyzes 
in any detail the decades after 1970 as a distinct time period.  More 
specifically, no study reveals the immense drop in state supreme courts 
actively using economic substantive due process review after 1970. 
And drop the numbers did.  Whether the judicial history of the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s is labeled “judicial activism” or “protecting the rights of 
the individual,” it was not to last.169  During the 1970s state supreme courts 
applied economic substantive due process in protecting economic liberties 
on forty-eight occasions.170  Admittedly, this is not a drastic departure from 
past practices, but was a significant drop from the sixty-seven of the 
1960s.171  The bottom fell out of the market in the 1980s, with a mere 
eleven instances.172  In the 1990s the numbers fell even further, to eight.173  
So far during the 2000s, this research has uncovered a paltry three 
occasions where state supreme courts have protected economic liberties 
through applying economic substantive due process.174  In addition, fewer 
and fewer states have continued their past application of the doctrine.175  
Since 1980 only thirteen state supreme courts have added to this study’s 
case law.176 
This Article now turns to a state-by-state assessment of trends in 
economic substantive due process, and similar doctrines, since 1940.  It 
begins with those states that were active in their protection of economic 
liberties through economic substantive due process in the decades 
following the New Deal, and have continued to be at least somewhat active 
since 1980.  For the sake of convenience and brevity, this Part does not 
analyze each and every state that has done so, but only highlights the three 
particularly interesting examples of Florida, Illinois, and Georgia.  This 
Article then turns to states that were active in the years immediately 
following the Lochner era but who have since refused to apply the doctrine. 
A.  States That Were Active in Applying Economic Substantive Due Process 
                                                          
 169. See infra Appendix B (indicating that 231 state supreme court cases  involving 
economic substantive due process rights were decided between 1940 and 1970, while only 
seventy were decided since). 
 170. See infra Appendix B. 
 171. See infra Appendix B. 
 172. See infra Appendix B. 
 173. See infra Appendix B. 
 174. Please remember that this does not include the use of economic substantive due 
process in land use zoning cases.  See supra Part I.B (explaining that land use cases were 
excluded from this study because courts have not analyzed economic substantive due 
process claims consistently in this area). 
 175. See infra Appendix B (noting that thirty-four states used economic substantive due 
process before 1980 but not since 1980). 
 176. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.  See 
infra Appendix B. 
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After 1940, and Have Continued to Since 1980 
1.  Florida!  Florida!  Florida!177 
Head and shoulders above the rest, the Florida Supreme Court has 
continuously protected economic liberty through the application of 
economic substantive due process.178  Since 1940 it has done so twenty-
nine times.179  The nearest to this is Illinois, at sixteen.180  Most of the 
court’s economic substantive due process holdings were in the 1950s and 
1960s, but even the 1980s saw three instances, the most of any state 
supreme court in the nation.181  The most recent, Chicago Title Insurance 
Co. v. Butler,182 was a classic economic substantive due process opinion, 
where the court invalidated a statute limiting the rebates that insurance 
agents may receive.183  The court’s history includes many of the “usual 
suspects” discussed earlier in this Article, including price controls,184 
advertising restrictions,185 Sunday closing laws,186 different incarnations of 
the state’s Fair Trade Act,187 and occupational licensing laws.188  
                                                          
 177. “Florida, Florida, Florida.  I honestly believe, Matt, as goes Florida, will go the 
nation.”  Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 2000) (Tim Russert to Matt Lauer 
on the eve of the 2000 presidential election). 
 178. See infra Appendix B (comparing the number of cases decided in Florida involving 
economic substantive due process with the number of cases in other states). 
 179. See infra Appendix B. 
 180. See infra Appendix B.  This number does not include a large number of Illinois land 
use zoning cases that are excluded for reasons stated in Part I.B.  See, e.g., City of Loves 
Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 153 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. 1958) (concluding that zoning 
of lot for residential purposes, adjacent to automobile plant, is beyond the legitimate use of 
the police power); Mack v. County of Cook, 142 N.E.2d 785, 788-89 (Ill. 1957) (holding 
that classification of property as non-commercial is not a proper use of the police power); 
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 115 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 1953) (zoning of land in mostly 
industrial area as “residential” is “manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious”). 
 181. See infra Appendix B. 
 182. 770 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2000). 
 183. Id. at 1220 (“[T]he anti-rebate statutes . . . unconstitutionally restrict a citizen’s 
rights to freely bargain for services.”). 
 184. See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So. 2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 1976) 
(concluding that energy price restrictions are unconstitutional because, inter alia, they 
exceed the state’s police power). 
 185. See, e.g., Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1963) 
(invalidating an ordinance banning outdoor advertising of lodging accommodations as an 
infringement on the right to advertise business); Town of Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So. 
2d 188, 192-93 (Fla. 1955) (determining that an ordinance regulating the size of gas station 
signs is not rationally related to the public safety or health). 
 186. See, e.g., Moore v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961) (determining that a 
Sunday closing law for used automobile dealers exceeded the state’s police power). 
 187. See, e.g., Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954) (invalidating a 
non-signer clause of a state fair trade act because the clause caused anticompetitive pricing 
and was an unacceptable use of the police power); Liquor Store v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 
40 So. 2d 371, 385 (Fla. 1949) (invalidating a provision of the Fair Trade Act that prevented 
selling products below the fixed price as arbitrary and unreasonable). 
 188. See, e.g., Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So. 2d 439, 442 ( Fla. 1963) 
(concluding that an education requirement for masseurs constituted an invalid use of the 
police power); Sullivan v. DeCerb, 23 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945) (holding that a 
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Furthermore, the court innovated in other areas of substantive due process 
to some extent, including two race track related tax cases189 and a decision 
striking down a ban on the possession of embossing machines.190 
The reasons for the Florida Supreme Court’s extraordinary use of 
economic substantive due process, including the motivations behind the 
state’s individual justices, local history outside of that Court’s case law, or 
unusual machinations in the state’s legislature,191 are beyond the scope of 
this study.  Although this Article briefly explores what has led to the recent 
nationwide decline in the use of economic substantive due process under 
state constitutional law,192 speculations on individual states, even in the 
case of mighty Florida, rely on too few data points to be of much value.  
What may briefly be said is that the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted 
a “due process clause” nearly identical to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
striking down economic regulations.193  In short, the Florida opinions listed 
in Appendix A by and large textually rest on nothing more than a “generic” 
due process clause and the extra-textual bases of exceeding the police 
power or lacking a rational basis.194  Nevertheless, with as much a textual 
commitment to economic liberty as the Fourteenth Amendment, the Florida 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Florida Constitution to protect economic 
                                                          
photography licensing scheme exceeded the proper exercise of the police power because it 
had no reasonable relation to the general welfare). 
 189. See, e.g., Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 397 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla. 1981) (holding that a permit 
scheme deducting one percent of race winnings and transferring funds to private 
associations constituted an invalid exercise of the state’s police power); Hialeah Race 
Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 625, 628-29 (Fla. 1971) (striking 
down as violating substantive due process a statute regulating race track operating days 
according to the amount of tax revenue the track produced in the preceding year). 
 190. State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (Fla. 1986) (striking down a statute 
criminalizing the possession of embossing machines on substantive due process grounds 
because the blanket prohibition impermissibly interfered with the rights of people who used 
the machines for their business). 
 191. All of these reasons are purely hypothetical and could be applied to any state 
government.  They are the type of reasons, however, that may account for a state’s stepped-
up enforcement of economic substantive due process.  For a discussion of how the use of 
economic substantive due process at the state level may be superior to that under the Federal 
Constitution, precisely because local variations in state economies may countenance 
different results under economic substantive due process review, see Hetherington, supra 
note 15, at 250. 
 192. See infra Part IV (advocating a theory that conservative judges declined to use 
economic substantive due process in their decisions after the controversial outcome of Roe 
v. Wade). 
 193. Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”).  
The Florida Constitution does include language that directly protects economic liberties, but 
the state supreme court has not been active in relying upon it.  See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 
(“All natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and 
defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, 
possess and protect property . . . .”). 
 194. See infra Appendix A. 
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liberty through economic substantive due process more than any other state 
court of highest review since 1940.195  Perhaps the lesson to be taken from 
this is that it is not the text of the constitution that matters in whether a 
court protects an economic liberty.  Instead, the reasons may be non-
textual, or even non-legal. 
2.  Illinois 
A very distant second to Florida, the Illinois Supreme Court has struck 
down economic regulations under economic substantive due process on 
sixteen occasions.196  This has run the gamut of different areas of economic 
regulation, from keeping auto records197 to mandating that employers pay 
their employees while they leave to vote.198  Occupational licensing has 
taken many hits from the court, with it striking down four plumbing 
licensing schemes alone.199  Other anti-licensing opinions include the 
invalidation of the requirement that a funeral director obtain an embalmer’s 
license,200 and a case from as recently as 1995 invalidating a scheme 
licensing private alarm contractors.201 
Illinois stands as an interesting exception when viewing its Supreme 
Court’s performance against the nationwide trend of economic substantive 
                                                          
 195. See infra Appendix B (indicating that the Florida Supreme Court has decided 
twenty-nine economic substantive due process cases since the 1940s, while the next most 
active state was Illinois, with sixteen cases). 
 196. See infra Appendix B. 
 197. See People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 768-69 (Ill. 2000) (invalidating a statute that 
penalized auto parts recycling businesses for failing to keep accurate records regardless of 
the record-keeper’s intent as an unreasonable means to achieve the state’s goal of preventing 
the trafficking of stolen vehicles and parts). 
 198. See Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 697-98 (Ill. 1955) 
(determining that a “pay-while-voting” statute directed at only one class of employees “has 
no real or substantial relation to the object of public welfare” and therefore is an 
unconstitutional use of the police power).  The Kentucky Court of Appeals struck down a 
similar statute.  See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 973, 975 (Ky. 
1947) (determining that the “pay-for-voting” scheme is an arbitrary and unfair use of 
legislative power and prohibited by the Kentucky Constitution). 
 199. See People v. Johnson, 369 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977) (holding that a plumbing 
licensing scheme, as implemented, created an unconstitutional monopoly power in the hands 
of already licensed plumbers); People v. Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971) (striking 
down a plumbing licensing law requiring plumbers to pay an annual feel in order to become 
certified as arbitrary and unreasonable); Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E.2d 169, 171-73 (Ill. 
1953) (striking down a plumbing licensing law as an improper exercise of the police power); 
People v. Brown, 95 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1950) (striking down various arduous plumbing 
licensing restrictions as violating substantive due process because the restrictions 
impermissibly interfered with the basic right to work in a legitimate business). 
 200. Gholson v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ill. 1956) (striking down a regulation on 
substantive due process grounds, and concluding “[t]he record does not, in our opinion, 
establish that public health considerations justify the requirement that a funeral director be a 
licensed embalmer”). 
 201. Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580-81 (Ill. 1995) (finding a licensing scheme 
applicable to private alarm contractors unconstitutional as an invalid use of the police power 
because it places considerable barriers on a person who wishes to work in a legitimate 
business). 
SANDERS OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:00:52 PM 
490 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:457 
due process cases.202  With the exception of the roaring 1950s, when the 
Illinois Supreme Court utilized the doctrine in non-land use zoning cases 
seven times,203 in no decade since 1940 has the court issued more than 
three opinions striking down an economic regulation on substantive due 
process grounds.204  Yet, the court has issued at least one such opinion in 
every decade except for the 1980s, including the 2000s.205  This long, but 
measured, tail stretching out from the Lochner era illustrates how a court 
can create a tempered, yet alive, jurisprudence of economic liberty.206   
3.  Georgia 
This Section closes with a relatively recent opinion from the Georgia 
Supreme Court.  It is one of the most recent examples of a state supreme 
court explicitly rejecting the federal courts’ non-use of economic 
substantive due process.207  In 1987, while striking down a ban on sales 
below cost, the court had the following to say about its constitutional 
jurisprudence: 
This court has repeatedly declared that the right to contract, and 
for the seller and purchaser to agree upon a price, is a property 
right protected by the due-process clause of our Constitution, and 
unless it is a business affected with a public interest, the General 
Assembly is without authority to abridge that right . . . no matter 
what other states or the Supreme Court of the United States may 
or may not have decided.208 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s insistence on continuing to apply the 
“affected with a public interest” test209 is a throw-back to the pre-Nebbia 
period of the Lochner era.210  In Strickland the court affirmed an earlier 
determination211 that the petroleum industry is not affected with a public 
                                                          
 202. See infra Appendix B (comparing the total of substantive economic due process 
decisions state-by-state for seven decades). 
 203. See infra Appendix B. 
 204. See infra Appendix B. 
 205. See infra Appendix B. 
 206. For an argument that the United States Supreme Court should strike a similar 
balance by applying a level of rational-basis scrutiny to economic regulations, yet a stricter 
level of rational-basis than that currently applied, see the comments of President Clinton’s 
former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights & 
Personal Liberty, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 13-16 (2004), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/docs/2004/indivisibility.pdf. 
 207. Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co. 353 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. 1987). 
 208. Strickland, 353 S.E.2d at 18 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra Part II.A (describing a time period where both state supreme courts and 
the United States Supreme Court regularly struck down economic regulations). 
 211. See Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ga. 1986) (“As it 
cannot be said that the gasoline industry is devoted to the citizens of this state and its use 
granted to the public, we conclude that the gasoline industry is not affected with a public 
interest . . . .”). 
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interest.212  Because it was not, the legislature therefore lacked the power to 
regulate its prices.213 
The Court’s statement that the Georgia General Assembly has no 
authority to abridge the right to contract “no matter what other states or the 
Supreme Court of the United States may or may not have decided”214 may 
at first sound like a bit of libertarian bravado, but it is actually little 
different from statements state courts routinely make regarding the U.S. 
Supreme Court in matters of criminal law and privacy.215  The statement’s 
spirit is consonant with Justice Brennan’s battle cry to the states discussed 
in the Introduction.216  The Georgia Supreme Court’s refusal to accept the 
conventional wisdom on the right to contract217 illustrates that in the State 
of Georgia, at least as of 1987, the “New Judicial Federalism” is alive and 
well in its attempt to preserve the legacy of the Lochner era.218 
B.  States That Were Active After 1940, but Have not Utilized Economic 
Substantive Due Process Since 1980 
As with the previous section, the following does not review every state 
supreme court that fits in this category, but investigates a few examples 
illustrating how a state judiciary may actively enforce the principles of 
economic substantive due process review for a time before letting the 
doctrine die away.  The states considered are Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
                                                          
 212. See Strickland, 353 S.E.2d at 18 (determining that a gasoline price fixing scheme 
was unconstitutional because the gasoline industry is not affected with a public interest). 
 213. See id. (relying on Georgia case law in striking down legislation regulating and 
fixing prices with respect to industries that are not affected with a public interest). 
 214. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215. See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990) (extending rights to 
citizens under the state constitution that the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended under the 
U.S. Constitution); see also supra note 2 (noting that state courts often interpret their 
constitutions differently than the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted analogous provisions 
of the Federal Constitution). 
 216. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan’s seminal 
law review article, in which he encouraged the states to interpret their constitutions liberally 
in the face of the Supreme Court’s growing conservatism). 
 217. See Strickland, 353 S.E.2d at 18 (explicitly rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
refusal to protect the right to contract). 
 218. The Georgia Supreme Court has a long history of pining for the Lochner era.  In 
1951 the court complained at length regarding the plight of economic liberties in the face of 
cases such as Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).  See Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 
692, 694 (Ga. 1951) (implicitly agreeing with the dissenting opinion in Nebbia in finding 
that the state legislature had no legitimate reason to fix the price of milk).  Chief Justice 
Duckworth of the Georgia Supreme Court, in condemning Nebbia, even argued that, in the 
face of a world-wide war against communism, it would not be right to turn over to the 
legislature all decisions regarding economic regulation, and that “[b]y such conduct the 
legislature, aided and abetted by the judiciary of this state, could ultimately convert Georgia 
into a socialistic State despite the plain provisions of the Constitution which forbid such.”  
Id. at 698 (Duckworth, C.J., concurring).  Regarding such an attitude, one commentator 
mildly noted, “[t]he Georgia Supreme Court . . . found the self restraint philosophy 
distasteful.”  Note, supra note 15, at 317. 
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South Carolina. 
1. Indiana 
After four holdings enforcing economic substantive due process in the 
1940s,219 in 1952 the Indiana Supreme Court drew the following line in the 
sand between itself and the contemporary trend of constitutional law:  
“This court has in the past consistently refused to follow the ‘pattern’ or 
‘drift’ apparent in the decisions of other courts which approve mere 
legislative price fixing.”220  The court struck down several restrictions on 
automobile dealers because they were not reasonably related to the 
legislative purpose of preventing fraud.221  In doing so it proudly cited a 
Lochner-era case, Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,222 which struck down a 
Pennsylvania statute restricting ownership of pharmacies to licensed 
pharmacists.223  However, twenty years after Holt, the U.S. Supreme Court 
overruled Liggett, labeling it “a derelict in the stream of the law.”224 
Four years after Holt, the Indiana Supreme Court utilized the doctrine 
again, striking down a restriction on automobile dealers.225  After that, 
however, the court left the field.  Since 1956 the court has refused to 
invalidate an economic regulation on economic substantive due process 
grounds.226  Such a “switch in time” is not, of course, unusual,227 but it is 
quite a contrast to the practice of other states that continued to fight the 
                                                          
 219. See infra Appendix B. 
 220. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 635 (Ind. 1952). 
 221. See id. at 635-36 (finding no link between making the retail seller of automobiles 
fully liable under recourse liability and the state objective to prevent fraud). 
 222. 278 U.S. 105 (1928). 
 223. Id. at 113-14.  See Holt, 108 N.E.2d at 635 (citing with approval Ligett’s reasons for 
overturning the Pennsylvania statute including the unreasonableness of the regulation and 
the lack of a substantial relationship to the public welfare). 
 224. See N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 166-
67 (1973) (agreeing with Justice Holmes’s dissent in Liggett which found an adequate 
relationship between the public health and the statutory requirement that licensed 
pharmacists own drugstores and sell drugs). 
 225. See Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) (striking 
down a bar on automobile dealers also selling auto insurance on grounds that there was no  
reasonable cause for the law). 
 226. See infra Appendix B.  The court has, however, invalidated land use zoning 
restrictions on economic substantive due process grounds since Motor Insurance Corp.  See 
Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion County v. Gateway Corp., 268 N.E.2d 736, 742 
(Ind. 1971) (upholding a trial court ruling refusing to enforce a zoning ordinance when 
application of the ordinance would preclude the property owner from using his property “for 
any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted”); Bd. of Zoning Appeals of New Albany v. 
Koehler, 194 N.E.2d 49, 54-55 (Ind. 1963) (deciding that when a zoning ordinance does not 
promote or protect the public welfare and invades property rights, the ordinance is 
unconstitutional). 
 227. This refers to the switch in voting practices by Chief Justice Hughes between 1936 
and 1937.  See Michael Comiskey, Can a President Pack—or Draft—the Supreme Court?  
FDR and the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1046 
(1994) (discussing generally the switch in Chief Justice Hughes’s voting pattern). 
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trend in constitutional law for decades more.228 
2.  Massachusetts 
The now “liberal” Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts229 extended 
its respect for liberty into the economic sphere in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 
and even 1970s.230  This included two cases striking down compulsory auto 
insurance mandates,231 as well as occupational licensing rulings.232  The 
original opening to the state’s constitution reflected a deep commitment to 
economic liberty, proclaiming, “[a]ll men are born free and equal, and have 
certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be 
                                                          
 228. See supra Part II.B.  However, some states have followed Indiana’s trend.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court made a similar defiant comment to that in Holt in 1952: 
In by-gone days when government was deemed to be a responsibility of the people, 
rather than the people being a responsibility of government, as is unfortunately too 
much the case today, all legislation of the character now under consideration was 
deemed an unreasonable interference with the right of the individual to contract and 
to own and enjoy private property.  Laws attempting to fix minimum wages or 
prices were uniformly held invalid as being in violation of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Christian v. La Forge, 242 P.2d 797, 805 (Or. 1952).  Admittedly, the court went on to 
admit that the law had changed “and, in most respects, justly so.”  Id.  Nevertheless, the 
court went on to strike-down the barber-pricing regulation as an unreasonable interference 
with the right to carry-on a business.  Id. at 809.  This sentiment had little long term effect.  
The court has not enforced economic substantive due process, broadly understood, since the 
1960s.  See infra Appendix B (indicating that the Oregon Supreme Court has not decided a 
case on economic substantive due process grounds since the 1960s).  “Broadly understood” 
is worth emphasizing because the Oregon Constitution lacks either a “due process clause” or 
a “law of the land” clause.   
 229. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) 
(declaring that denying same-sex marriage violates equal protection under the state’s 
constitution and defining civil marriage as the union of two persons, rather than the union of 
a man and a woman); Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and the Constitution:  
Historical and Contemporary Issues, HERITAGE LECTURES, Apr. 11, 2005, at 1, 6, available 
at http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/hl871.cfm (calling the decision in 
Goodridge the work of “four liberal Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court justices” and 
arguing that decisions such as this force culturally leftist views about marriage on society). 
 230. See infra Appendix B (demonstrating that throughout this time period the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided seven cases involving economic substantive due 
process rights). 
 231. See Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970) 
(holding that maximum rates set for compulsory auto insurance were unconstitutionally low 
as they were confiscatory); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 
(Mass. 1970) (finding that legislatively-fixed maximum rates that insurers could charge for 
automobile insurance were confiscatory and that it is within the power of the judicial branch 
to review such rates for constitutional sufficiency). 
 232. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631, 632-33 (Mass. 1958) (stating that 
a proposed regulation on the hours barbers may keep that had no connection to public health 
or safety would violate economic liberties); Mansfield Beauty Acad., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Registration of Hairdressers, 96 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Mass. 1951) (striking down a statute 
barring beauty schools from accepting payment for hairdressing students rendering services 
because it had no legitimate connection to public health or safety); Opinion of the Justices, 
79 N.E.2d 883, 887-88 (Mass. 1948) (stating that a proposed bill seeking to bar cemetery 
owners and operators from selling cemetery monuments would be an invalid exercise of the 
police power because such a prohibition was unrelated to the public welfare). 
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reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that 
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking 
and obtaining their safety and happiness.”233  This commitment to 
economic liberty contributed to the court’s opinion in Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Public Health in 1965.234 
Coffee-Rich involved a challenge to a law prohibiting the sale of a dairy 
substitute product.235  The court reasoned that the consumer-protection 
regulation at issue was unconstitutional because it failed to consider the 
actual likelihood that a consumer would mistake the product for real 
cream.236  Assessing the argument that the bar was necessary to prevent 
fraud, the court bluntly, and repeatedly, stated that members of the public 
must be given some credit in determining for themselves what a product 
actually is: 
We think that average consumers are aware that milk and cream are not 
“vegetable product[s].” Similarly, advertising matter displayed on the 
frozen food counters from which Coffee-Rich is purveyed clearly and 
conspicuously states that Coffee-Rich is a ‘frozen non-dairy’ product. 
Again, we think that average consumers are aware that milk and cream 
are dairy products. . . . We do not believe that an average consumer 
would buy this product under the mistaken impression that it is milk or 
cream.237 
Because it could be assumed that the public read the labels of Coffee-
Rich products, the court concluded that the consumer-protection 
justification for the law was illusory.238  Such an inquiry, however, was not 
                                                          
 233. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1, amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVI. 
 234. 204 N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1965). 
 235. Id. at 283.  Other state supreme courts have struck down restrictions on the sale of 
alternative dairy products.  See, e.g., People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 
P.2d 940, 945 ( Colo. 1971) (ruling that the Filled Dairy Products Act, outlawing the use 
of a vegetable substitute for sour cream, exceeded state police powers and violated 
substantive due process); Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Trenhaile, 486 P.2d 1021, 1024 
(Idaho 1971) (striking down statute banning “filled milk” under substantive due process 
because there was no reasonable relation between the statute and the state’s exercise of 
police powers); Brackman v. Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (Mont. 1948) (declaring prohibitive 
oleomargarine licensing fees unconstitutional as “excessive, confiscatory and prohibitive”); 
Flynn v. Horst, 51 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. 1947) (determining that an act licensing the sale of 
oleomargarine bore no rational relation to the state’s police power and therefore violated 
substantive due process). 
 236. Coffee Rich, 204 N.E.2d at 284-88.  But see Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Health, 194 N.E.2d 838, 843 (Mass. 1963) (upholding a ban on the sale of imitation 
cream because the likelihood that the average consumer would confuse Instantblend with 
actual cream was too great). 
 237. Coffee-Rich, 204 N.E.2d at 287-88.  The court also noted, “It seems to us that the 
defendants’ reasons for attempting to prohibit the sale of Coffee-Rich are more fanciful than 
real.”  Id. at 288 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948)). 
 238. See id. at 288 (finding that there was no evidence before the court upon which it 
could conclude that the manufacturing or labeling of Coffee-Rich confused or misled the 
public). 
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to stay in the state’s jurisprudence for long.  Eight years later the court 
stated that it employed the equivalent of the federal rational-basis test in 
reviewing economic regulation, asserting that “any rational basis of fact 
that reasonably can be conceived to sustain [the act of legislation]” will 
prevent a challenge to economic regulation.239  Since then the court has not 
employed economic substantive due process to strike down a restriction on 
economic liberty.240 
3.  South Carolina 
In the decades after the close of the Lochner era, South Carolina used 
economic substantive due process to protect economic liberty; however, 
beginning in the 1970s, it did not enforce the doctrine for many years and 
then whole-heartedly repudiated its use.241  In the 1960s the South Carolina 
Supreme Court repeatedly struck down the regulation of milk prices.242  In 
Gwynette v. Myers,243 the court examined the various opinions in Nebbia v. 
New York244 and explicitly adopted the reasoning from Justice 
McReynolds’s dissent.245  McReynolds had stated that “fixation of the price 
at which A, engaged in an ordinary business, may sell, in order to enable B, 
a producer, to improve his condition, has not been regarded as within 
                                                          
 239. Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Mass. 1973).  The 
court further stated that “[i]t is not within [its] province to pass upon the wisdom of an 
enactment.”  If there was any room for debate, the court conceded that it “cannot substitute 
[its] judgment for that of the Legislature.”  Id. at 360 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kimball 
Jewelers, Inc., 132 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Mass. 1956)); see also Howard, supra note 15, at 882-
83 (stating that Massachusetts’s highest court, and those of some other states, “defer to 
legislative judgments in terms similar to those used by the United States Supreme Court”). 
 240. See infra Appendix B (revealing that no substantive economic due process case was 
decided in Massachusetts during the 1980s, 1990s, or 2000s).  But see Zuckerman v. Town 
of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 2004) (finding in a zoning case that, absent special 
circumstances, “restrictions of unlimited duration on a municipality’s rate of development 
are in derogation of the general welfare and thus are unconstitutional”). 
 241. See infra Appendix B (indicating that the South Carolina Supreme Court did not 
decide any economic substantive due process cases in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). 
 242. See, e.g., Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967) 
(finding a milk price-control law unconstitutional); Stone v. Salley, 137 S.E.2d 788, 792-93 
(S.C. 1964) (noting that in spite of the United States Supreme Court’s decision upholding 
the right of states to fix milk prices, the South Carolina court’s interpretation of its 
Constitution supports a finding that the State’s milk price-control law violates substantive 
due process); Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 680 (S.C. 1960) (declaring that a milk 
price-control law was an illegitimate exercise of the police power). 
 243. 115 S.E.2d 673 (S.C. 1960). 
 244. 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding a New York law fixing the price of milk and 
noting that when a law is reasonably related to its proper legislative function and is not 
arbitrary, due process is satisfied). 
 245. See Gwynette, 115 S.E.2d at 679 (recognizing that legislative economic control over 
private industries is acceptable only when such industry is devoted to public use and the 
legislation directly concerns the public welfare (citing Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539, 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting)).  The Gwynette court further stated, “[t]he majority opinion in 
[Nebbia], however conclusive as to applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, does 
not control us in the interpretation of the Constitution of this state, under which the issue 
here arises.”  Id. 
SANDERS OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:00:52 PM 
496 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:457 
legislative power.”246  He reasoned that if the courts deferred to the 
legislature in their determination of when a price regulation was necessary 
for the public interest, then the legislature could always evade judicial 
review of such enactments and that “such a view, of course, would put an 
end to liberty under the Constitution.”247  Relying on this, the South 
Carolina Court struck down the price control as an illegitimate exercise of 
the police power.248 
Years passed by, and then in 2000 the Court overruled all of these milk 
price control cases.249  Asserting that only it and the Georgia Supreme 
Court still engaged in the “affected with a public interest” inquiry, it 
handed the legislature much broader powers in its ability to regulate 
economic and social policy.250  As seen throughout this Article, such a 
statement regarding South Carolina and Georgia is misleading when taking 
into account the existence of recent cases in other states utilizing economic 
substantive due process.251  Furthermore, although courts might refuse to 
enforce some of them, almost all of the cases listed in Appendix A have not 
been explicitly overruled.  South Carolina, in that way, stands as an 
exception.252 
IV.  WHY SUCH A PRECIPITOUS DECLINE? WAS ROE V. WADE THE FLY IN 
THE CONSERVATIVE OINTMENT? 
Although economic substantive due process still functions in the state 
                                                          
 246. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 554 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 247. Id. at 555. 
 248. See Gwynette, 115 S.E.2d at 679 (recognizing that although the milk industry is 
vital to the public, this alone does not grant the legislature power to fix milk prices in retail 
stores). 
 249. See R.L. Jordan Co. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000) 
(adopting a “reasonable relationship” standard to determine the constitutionality of 
economic and social welfare legislation and overruling the “Dairy Commission cases” to the 
extent that they are contrary to the new rule). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See infra Appendix A (collecting cases involving economic substantive due process 
issues from the fifty states and showing that in recent years Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, Montana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have used substantive due process to strike down 
economic legislation).  It may have been true that, strictly speaking, only South Carolina 
and Georgia used the “affected with a public interest” test, but, as has been previously 
mentioned, other states invalidated economic regulations through other manifestations of 
economic substantive due process. 
 252. In addition to South Carolina, the West Virginia Supreme Court has overruled some 
of its post-1940 economic substantive due process opinions.  See State v. Wender, 141 
S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965) (striking down cigarette minimum price law as violating 
substantive due process), overruled by Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale 
Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984); State v. Mem’l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101 
S.E.2d 425, 432 (W.Va. 1957) (deciding that regulation of pre-need sales of funeral items 
violates substantive due process), overruled by Whitener v. W.Va. Bd. of Embalmers & 
Funeral Dirs., 288 S.E.2d 543, 545 (W.Va. 1982). 
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courts, it is nothing like what it was only thirty years ago.253  What explains 
this drop, especially after the relatively prolific use of the doctrine by state 
courts in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s?  Commentators have proposed 
various ideas for why state courts hung onto the doctrine in those decades 
immediately following the close of the Lochner era, but because this 
Article is the first to recognize the more recent drop in the use of the 
doctrine, no studies have so far suggested a reason for it.  This Part will 
introduce some possible answers.  One is that state judges who were legally 
trained during the Lochner era had a hard time coming to grips with the 
revolution of the New Deal, and clung onto the doctrine until they began 
retiring en masse in the 1970s.  Another is that state justices experimented 
for a time with economic substantive due process under a “New Judicial 
Federalism” approach, and then, for whatever reason, backed away from 
the experiment in the 1970s and 1980s.  A more controversial hypothesis, 
and that advocated here, is that conservatives’ abhorrence of the result in 
Roe v. Wade,254 and of the case’s substantive due process analysis, turned 
many traditional advocates of economic substantive due process into critics 
of substantive due process review generally.  In the process, economic 
substantive due process under state constitutional law was not eviscerated, 
but injured severely. 
A.  The Old Judges Die Hard, and Judicial Experimentation, Hypotheses 
In 1976 Professor A.E. Dick Howard, a leading authority on state 
constitutional law, had this to say concerning the continued use of 
economic substantive due process in state courts: 
Old habits die hard, and it is not surprising that state court judges in the 
1950’s were still thinking in substantive due process terms.  That 
generation of judges had completed their legal education well before 
even the Supreme Court had begun to reject the premises of the cases 
decided early in the twentieth century.  One might expect, however, that 
by the 1970’s, with the Supreme Court’s renunciation of substantive due 
process in economic cases so clear and so widely known, state courts 
would have fallen in line, and limited their own review of legislative 
judgments touching social and economic questions.  A look at state court 
decisions since the 1960’s and 1970’s shows that this has not 
happened.255 
As this Article has illustrated, it did happen.  Was Professor Howard 
                                                          
 253. See infra Appendix B (collecting data that shows only seven out of fifty states 
decided economic substantive due process cases in the 1980s, only seven out of fifty in the 
1990s, and only three out of fifty in the 2000s). 
 254. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).  For a discussion of Roe’s holding, see infra notes 274-
278 and accompanying text. 
 255. Howard, supra note 15, at 882. 
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merely wrong about the data and not about the judges?  As more and more 
law students graduated after studying West Coast Hotel v. Parrish256 
instead of Lochner,257 perhaps the tipping point finally came in the 1970s, 
and by the 1980s and 1990s these new judges were firmly in command of 
the nation’s state supreme courts, ready to avoid the ghosts of Lochner that 
had haunted their chambers since the 1930s. 
This proposal could possibly be the correct explanation.  However, it 
does not satisfactorily explain the rise in economic substantive due process 
opinions from the 1940s to the 1950s.  The rise was considerable—from 
sixty-eight to ninety-six.258  Was this a “last gasp” of the old guard of 
“Lochnerians” striking back against the forces of the New Deal?259  
Perhaps.  Yet, at the same time, this explanation sounds a bit too 
conspiratorial for fifty sets of jurists.  Perhaps instead, the judges of the 
1950s collectively tried to experiment with economic substantive due 
process under their own constitutions, and later assessed the experiment a 
failure.260 
As has been argued elsewhere (in normative evaluations of state 
economic substantive due process), there are valid reasons for rejecting 
such review at the federal level while keeping it in state courts.261  For one 
thing, state judges are often elected, so if the voters feel that a judge is 
interjecting too many personal socioeconomic views into opinions the 
voters can remove her.262  Furthermore, state constitutions are generally 
much easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution.263  If the people or the 
legislature disagree with a state supreme court’s decision to protect 
economic liberty through the state constitution’s due process clause, they 
can amend the constitution to preclude such an interpretation.264  In 
                                                          
 256. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 257. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 258. See infra Appendix B. 
 259. See, e.g., supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text (discussing the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 
635 (Ind. 1952), and analyzing the court’s refusal to blindly follow legislative price fixing, 
contrary to other courts’ tendency to do so, and its willingness to follow Lochner-era cases. 
 260. This experimentation often extended to the Fourteenth Amendment as well.  See 
supra notes 101-114 and accompanying text (discussing the tactic often used by state courts 
of highest review in striking down an economic regulation on both state and federal 
grounds, thus insulating it from review by the United States Supreme Court). 
 261. See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 9, at 248 (recognizing that there is no plausible national 
interest to support federal judicial meddling in local state economic matters). 
 262. See Newberg, supra note 18, at 267 (stating that “in all but three states the judges of 
the highest state courts are subject to various forms of majoritarian review . . . .”). 
 263. See id.  (pointing out that many states allow for amending the constitution through a 
referendum or initiative and noting that in a nine year period, between 1970 and 1979, the 
states collectively adopted over 900 constitutional amendments). 
 264. The United States Constitution, in fact, possesses several amendments that sought 
to rectify a past Supreme Court interpretation.  For instance, the Eleventh Amendment was a 
direct response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).  See also Tribe, supra 
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addition, state courts “may better adapt their decisions to local economic 
conditions and needs” because their decisions concern the economy of only 
one state.265  It may be that a regulation that is unreasonable in one market 
is a legitimate exercise of the police power in another.266  Another 
suggestion is that state legislatures, not to mention town councils, are much 
more susceptible to direct and one-sided special interest lobbying than is 
Congress.267  State justices are perhaps better attuned to local political 
forces and motivations, and can use review of new regulations to ferret out 
local protectionist legislation.268 
Therefore, with these and similar justifications on the minds of state 
judges, perhaps the 1950s were a time for experimentation, followed by, 
for whatever reason, a pull-back in the 1960s that only grew in the 1970s 
and beyond. 
B.  The Convergence Hypothesis 
A different view is that something other than attrition or judicial 
experimentation, and something specific, caused the heavy drop in cases 
from the 1960s to the 1970s, and especially from the 1970s to the 1980s.  
The 1970s, in fact, saw less of a drop, percentage-wise, from the previous 
decade (forty-eight following sixty-seven), than the 1960s did from its 
predecessor (sixty-seven following ninety-six).269  However, the drop from 
the 1970s to the 1980s was over four-fold (eleven following forty-eight).270  
Such a substantial drop after the much more gradual decline of the previous 
two decades does not square all that well with either the aging of old 
fashioned jurists or the abandonment of an experimental “new” state 
                                                          
note 68, at 64-65 & n.10 (noting “four (or perhaps five)” occasions and listing the 
Amendments in addition to the Eleventh Amendment, that sought to remedy unpopular 
Supreme Court decisions:  the Fourteenth Amendment, section 1 (nullifying Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)); the Sixteenth Amendment (nullifying Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)); the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
(nullifying Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)); the Nineteenth Amendment (reversing 
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874))). 
 265. Hetherington, supra note 15, at 250. 
 266. See id. (comparing hypothetical review of theater anti-scalping laws in Indiana and 
New York, taking into account the different theater markets, and concluding that legislative 
regulation may be appropriate in New York but inappropriate in Indiana where there is no 
booming theater industry). 
 267. This applies in other fields of legislation as well.  See W. David Slawson, The Right 
to Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 767-68 (1986) (stating that 
“[s]pecial interest legislation is of special concern to states because state legislatures are 
more susceptible to pressures from special interests than is Congress”). 
 268. See, e.g., Newberg, supra note 18, at 265 (arguing that state court economic 
substantive due process review is beneficial when the legislative process fails the public 
interest by catering to minority special interest groups). 
 269. See infra Appendix B. 
 270. See infra Appendix B. 
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approach to economic substantive due process.271  It would explain the 
change of one court, such as what happened to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the 1930s,272 but a wave of retirements, or a wave of experiments, taking 
less than ten years does not satisfactorily account for such a sudden change 
when those retirements and experiments are spread across fifty different 
jurisdictions.  This is not to say that these trends could not have caused the 
four-fold drop in cases, it is just to say that a specific event, or events, 
peculiar to the time better fits the data. 
If anything “big” happened to cause the four-fold drop it very likely took 
place in the 1970s.273  What in the field of economic substantive due 
process took place in the 1970s?  Other than what has been mentioned in 
this Article, not very much.  Leave off the word “economic,” however, and 
something seismic occurred. 
In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a woman has the 
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.274  Presaged by Griswold v. 
Connecticut in 1965,275 Roe partly relied upon the substantive component 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in recognizing that a 
woman’s right to privacy encompassed the right to choose to have an 
abortion.276  Although it drew largely on the recent precedent establishing 
the “right to privacy,” Roe was familiar to students of the Lochner court.277  
The Court identified an unenumerated right and then weighed that right 
against the state’s interest to act through the police power in protecting 
public health and safety.278  The most pertinent difference, of course, was 
                                                          
 271. See supra Part IV.A (discussing these theories). 
 272. See generally Comiskey, supra note 227 (describing changes on the Supreme Court 
during President Roosevelt’s presidency which ultimately resulted in seven Roosevelt 
appointees sitting on the Court). 
 273. Of course the event, or events, could have taken place earlier, but this would be 
more akin to a long-term cause, such as the attrition of judges. 
 274. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the “right of personal 
privacy includes the abortion decision,” but finding that the right is qualified and may be 
regulated by the state under certain circumstances). 
 275. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).  Griswold did not rely on the Due Process Clause, but 
the opinion of Justice Douglas famously discovered a right to privacy in the “penumbras, 
formed by emanations” of the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 484. 
 276. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. 
 277. The underpinnings of the “right to privacy” originated, to some degree, in the 
Lochner era.  Says Professor David Bernstein: 
Roe was especially difficult to distinguish from Lochner because its foundation is a 
series of Warren Court privacy decisions beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut.  
Griswold, in turn, not only asserted a nontextual right of privacy, but also relied on 
Lochner era civil liberties precedents.  Like Lochner itself, the Lochner era 
precedents relied upon in Griswold had invalidated state laws based on an 
expansive, substantive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  
David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
 278. The opinion stated, “[t]he Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy also 
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.  As 
noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in 
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that in this case the right was non-economic. 
As students of recent American politics know, many conservatives’ 
reaction to Roe was vicious, ongoing, and relentless.279  Much of this 
reaction pertained to the Court “making up rights” and “finding rights in 
the Constitution that are not there.”280  Critics have repeatedly tied Roe to 
cases of the Lochner era.  Comparisons with Lochner were inevitable 
because each case did essentially the same thing—protect unenumerated 
and (at least arguably) Lockean rights through a substantive interpretation 
of the Due Process Clause.281  Conservative jurist Robert Bork has 
compared both of these cases to the infamous Dred Scott decision.282  
Although he admits that, in terms of economic policy, he is predisposed to 
agree with the result in a case protecting economic liberties,283 he 
adamantly contends that it is not the judiciary’s place to protect rights that 
are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution.284 
After arguing that Dred Scott was perhaps “the first application of 
substantive due process in the Supreme Court,”285 Bork states, “Lochner 
employed substantive due process to strike down a state law limiting the 
hours of work by bakery employees.  Roe used substantive due process to 
create a constitutional right to abortion.  Lochner and Roe have, therefore, a 
very ugly common ancestor.”286  Bork employs the tactic of repeatedly 
referring to “Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe” collectively, as though they 
form an unbroken line of cases.287  Perhaps Bork himself would have 
denounced Lochner-era decisions whether or not Roe and its fellow privacy 
                                                          
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.”  Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. 
 279. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial 
Activism:  A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1096 (2005) 
(contending that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe “infuriated” certain conservative 
sectors of the country and touched off a culture war that has continued to the present time). 
 280. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, A Conservative View of the Court:  Getting Beyond 
“Activism” and “Restraint”, NAT’L REV., June 16, 2003, at 35, 36 (arguing that “Brennan-
era precedents” involved “the assertion of invented constitutional rights”). 
 281. A strong case can be made that Lochner was founded on a traditional understanding 
of the “substantive” component of due process, while Roe was a more flimsy attempt at 
finding a “right to privacy” in the Due Process Clause and other provisions of the 
Constitution.  What is important for the current thesis, however, is that both protected what 
might be characterized as Lockean rights through unenumerated constitutional protections. 
 282. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990) (arguing that Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, Lochner, and Roe are legitimate interpretations of the Constitution if one 
accepts that the Due Process Clause contains substantive content (citing Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856))). 
 283. See id. at 225 (stating that “I too . . . accept the correctness of laissez-faire, as so 
defined.”). 
 284. See id. at 351-52 (arguing that judges must always abide by the original 
understanding of the Constitution to prevent “preposterous” outcomes). 
 285. Id. at 32 (citing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:  THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 271 (1985)). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 32, 131, 193, 209. 
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cases had come to fruition.  Even so, Bork’s strict constructivism is highly 
attractive to a jurist who admires the free market, yet is adamantly opposed 
to the liberalization of abortion laws through judicial action.  In similar 
abhorrence of judicial power, conservative legal scholar  Lino A. Graglia 
has compared the methods of Roe and Lochner and argued that both are 
wrong because each turns a procedural limitation on government into a 
substantive one:  “The due process clause . . . has absolutely nothing to do 
with, for example, the power of New York State to limit the working hours 
of bakers or of Texas to restrict the availability of abortion.”288 
These sentiments illustrate a recognition of the similarity between Roe 
and cases invoking economic substantive due process. Once Roe was 
decided, those who vigorously disagreed with the legalization of abortion 
had to find fault with the case in order to have any hope of overturning it.  
The easiest way to do so was to discredit substantive due process itself.  
This would assist in overturning Roe, but would also discredit the use of 
“due process” clauses in protecting economic liberty.289 
The conservative criticism of the right to privacy was not the first time 
substantive due process had been denounced as a form of legislating from 
the bench.290  That began at least as long ago as the dawn of the Lochner 
era, with Professor Thayer’s seminal article, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law in 1893.291  Thayer argued for a 
deferential form of judicial review where a court should uphold a statute as 
constitutional as long as there exists some reasonable interpretation that 
would allow it to do so.292  His thesis was repeated in various forums, from 
Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner itself,293 to the arguments by 
progressive-era intellectuals that the individual’s economic liberties must 
make way for the government’s power to alleviate the suffering of 
                                                          
 288. Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”:  The Attempted Justification for the 
Supreme Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 795 (1987). 
 289. This is not to say Bork and Graglia changed their views in order to find fault with 
Roe.  It is to say that a jurist who valued economic substantive due process, yet was aghast 
at the result of Roe, might think about the former differently once faced with the existence 
of the later. 
 290. Indeed, it was not by any means the first time that a court had been tarred with the 
name “Lochner.”  See, e.g., Hetherington, supra note 15, at 249 (noting that “[f]requently 
dissents in cases [in state courts] holding regulations invalid on substantive due process 
grounds accuse the majority of resurrecting the concepts of Lochner v. New York”). 
 291. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130 (1893) (remarking that neither the United 
States Constitution nor the oath judges take upon being sworn in gives them the right of 
“reversing, displacing, or disregarding” acts of the legislature). 
 292. Id. at 144. 
 293. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that legislative judgments should be respected by the courts “unless it can be said that a 
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe 
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our 
law”). 
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capitalist society.294  As seen above,295 the U.S. Supreme Court finally 
made way for this new progressive jurisprudence with Nebbia v. New 
York296 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.297 
Why did this distaste not reach the state courts until relatively recently?  
An easy explanation, and a corollary to Professor Howard’s hypothesis 
regarding judicial attrition,298 is that the Justices of the U.S.  Supreme 
Court in the years immediately following West Coast Hotel were 
progressive scholars and politicians nominated by President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt.299  Mathematically speaking, it is easy to effectuate a 
change in the views of a body of nine by making a few personnel 
substitutions, especially where the concurrence of a mere five members 
will suffice.  However, it is much harder to change the minds of the justices 
of the several state courts of highest review, supreme in their interpretation 
of their own constitutions.  Therefore, it is not surprising that state justices 
stuck, to some degree, to the methodology of the Lochner era and ignored 
the vicissitudes of a small body consisting of favorites of a Democratic 
president. 
What is surprising, but only from today’s post-Roe perspective, is that 
state justices who embraced “substantive due process” in the face of the 
Supreme Court’s hostility were “conservative.”300  In 1950 Professor 
Monrad G. Paulsen stated that, regarding the Lochner court, “It has been 
                                                          
 294. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court & the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 
MICH. L. REV. 643, 670 (1909) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment leads it beyond the traditional scope of judicial 
power and into the legislative realm); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 
487 (1909) (declaring that legislatures attempting to enact legislation involving economic 
policy must learn how to work around the legacy of wrongly decided Supreme Court 
decisions on the issue). 
 295. See supra Part II.A (outlining the fall of economic substantive due process under 
federal constitutional law). 
 296. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 297. 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s adoption of a “rational basis” test to uphold legislative economic 
regulation and the Court’s abandonment of economic substantive due process). 
 298. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that the majority of state court judges had received 
their legal education during the Lochner era and were therefore reluctant to abandon a legal 
theory in which they were trained). 
 299. Ultimately, seven of the sitting justices were Roosevelt picks.  See Comiskey, supra 
note 227, at 1045 (stating that in selecting his Supreme Court nominees, Roosevelt sought 
specific qualifications for his justices, such as “an unwavering belief in the constitutionality 
of economic regulatory and social welfare legislation; an adherence to a generally libertarian 
and egalitarian constitutional philosophy; and a willingness to support broad executive 
authority to lead the nation in war.”). 
 300. Of course, just because a judge is labeled as a “conservative” does not mean that 
one actually is.  The term is, however, safe to use in this context, being that the Supreme 
Court that gave President Roosevelt so many problems was repeatedly labeled a 
“conservative” court.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris:  Economic 
Liberties Should not be Just for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 41 (2003) (noting that “[t]he 
Lochner era featured conservative Justices who were deeply committed to a laissez-faire 
economy, protecting business from legislative regulation.”). 
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charged that the doctrine of substantive due process has been the means 
whereby conservative judges have read classical economic theory into the 
Constitution.”301  In 1957 an article commented on the persistence of 
economic substantive due process under state constitutional law by stating 
that “in . . . states where more conservative social and economic theories 
still hold sway, the courts have refused to follow the federal due process 
doctrine and have clung to the older concept of substantive due process.”302 
Yet today, “conservative” jurists often assail substantive due process, 
whether of the economic or non-economic flavor, as alien to their 
jurisprudence.  While he sat on the bench of the Alabama Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Roy Moore was indisputably one of the most conservative 
jurists in the country.303  When concurring in a parental-notification case, 
Moore reflected on numerous scholars’ criticism of the doctrine’s use in 
Roe, asking, “Substantive due process?  The very phrase teeters on the edge 
of textual self-contradiction.”304  Chief Justice Moore did not mention 
Lochner and its ilk, but with such a denunciation of “substantive due 
process” as a whole, one would expect a similar rebuke of its economic 
subset.  Furthermore, Justice Scalia, no friend of progressive intellectuals, 
has proclaimed his contempt for substantive due process as expressed in 
Lochner.  In a punitive damages case where the question of substantive 
limitations on damages awards arose, he opined, “I do not accept the 
proposition that [the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] is 
the secret repository of all sorts of . . . unenumerated, substantive rights—
however fashionable that proposition may have been (even as to economic 
rights of the sort involved here) at the time of the Lochner-era 
cases . . . .”305 
Other examples are found across the post-1973 jurisprudence, in 
majority opinions, dissents, and concurrences.  In Schochet v. State, the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals went to great lengths to argue that the 
State had not violated the privacy rights of an unmarried heterosexual 
couple for a fellatio prosecution.306  The court cabined the U.S. Supreme 
                                                          
 301. Paulsen, supra note 15, at 92 (emphasis added). 
 302. Hoskins & Katz, supra note 15, at 400 (emphasis added).  It is very interesting that 
Hoskins and Katz referred to states that were not only more economically conservative, but 
also more socially conservative.  Today, to say that socially conservative judges better 
respect substantive due process than their liberal counterparts is to utter an absurdity. 
 303. Chief Justice Moore became famous for refusing to remove a replica of the Ten 
Commandments from the Alabama Supreme Court grounds in the face of a court order to do 
so.  See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Court Ousts “Ten Commandments Judge”, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at A3. 
 304. Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542, 550 (2001) (Moore, C.J., concurring) (citing 
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 773-74 (1999)). 
 305. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 306. 541 A.2d 183 (Md. Ct. App. 1988).   
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Court’s “right to privacy” cases as only applying to marital interests.307  In 
doing so, it went out of its way to state that Griswold v. Connecticut relied 
on “two decisions from the heyday of the Lochner v. New York era.”308  
The Maryland court also quoted Justice Holmes’ opinion in Tyson & Bro. 
United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, where he dissented from the 
Court’s striking-down of a control on ticket prices.309  Thus, the court used 
the specter of the Lochner era, and the words of Holmes (the era’s greatest 
contemporary critic), to minimize contemporary privacy rights 
jurisprudence.310  
In Commonwealth v. O’Neal,311 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts ruled that a law automatically imposing the death penalty 
for rape violated the state’s due process clause.  In dissent, Justice Reardon 
criticized the substantive due process approach the majority used, citing 
Roe and comparing the majority’s reasoning to “the theory of judicial 
intervention employed in the Lochner line of cases . . . .”312  In expressing 
his disagreement with the “right to privacy” cases he derogatorily quipped 
“it appears that the right of privacy is considered a fundamental interest 
protected by the due process clause.”313   
In Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Missouri 
Real Estate Commission,314 the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected an 
appeal to economic substantive due process in attacking the use of gifts in 
selling real estate.  In concurring in the opinion, Justice Donnelly 
lampooned not only substantive due process but the commercial speech 
doctrine as well.315  He asserted that the commercial speech doctrine, which 
the real estate company had also invoked, “may have been ‘an attempt to 
buttress’ the decision in Roe v. Wade, where the Court created a 
constitutional right to obtain an abortion.”316  He then concluded that the 
commercial speech doctrine was an attempt to return to the law the values 
of Lochner.317  Donnelly’s “conservative” credentials are not in doubt, at 
least in the Coldwell opinion, as he lamented the judicial supremecy of 
                                                          
 307. Id. at 188-190.   
 308. Id. at 188. 
 309. Id. at 189 (quoting Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973) (quoting 
Tyson & Bro. United Theater Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting))). 
 310. The Maryland Supreme Court later reversed the case on statutory grounds.  
Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, (Md. 1990). 
 311. 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975). 
 312. Id. at 702 (Reardon, J., dissenting). 
 313. Id. (Reardon, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)) 
(emphasis added). 
 314. 712 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1986). 
 315. Id. at 671-72 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).   
 316. Id. at 672 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).   
 317. Id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting).   
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Cooper v. Aaron,318 and hopefully predicted that “[w]ith the possibility of 
Reagan appointments to the Court now looming on the horizon, the elites 
are beginning to take another look at the Cooper assertion.”319  Justice 
Donnelly earlier wrote a similar opinion, where he explicitly connected 
Lochner and Roe as examples of judges imposing their views on the rest of 
society.320  Regarding the jurisprudence of Roe, Donnelly heralded, “I think 
it must be conceded, on the record, that some time ago we entered another 
Lochner Era.”321  
Meanwhile, in People v. Onofre,322 where the New York Court of 
Appeals struck down an anti-sodomy law, dissenting Judge Gabrielli noted 
the similarity between Griswold, Roe, and Lochner, stating, “The assertion 
that the theories espoused in Griswold, Roe and their progeny may be 
likened to the discredited doctrine of ‘substantive due process’ . . . would 
not come as a surprise to any serious constitutional scholar.”323  Later, in 
Lambert v. State,324 Judge Lumpkin, of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals, expressed a similar sentiment when concurring in upholding a 
death sentence for a mentally retarded defendant.325  Citing Dred Scott, 
Lochner, and Roe, the Judge stated, “Historically, each time appellate 
courts have ventured into the public policy forum and disregarded the rule 
of law, it has resulted in not only turmoil, but a denigration of the respect of 
the judicial system and the rule of law.326   
These many examples illustrate that many conservative jurists have 
come to the same conclusion that their liberal counterparts reached decades 
before:  economic substantive due process cannot be trusted.  This 
convergence, of course, occurred for very different reasons on each side of 
the aisle.  Liberals did not like economic substantive due process for the 
obvious policy outcomes while conservatives moved away because its use 
provided possible legitimacy for the parallel method used in Roe v. Wade.  
When faced with the choice of (1) distinguishing “economic substantive 
due process” from substantive due process and the “right to privacy,” and 
(2) discrediting the use of substantive due process altogether, enough 
conservative state justices appear to have chosen the latter approach so that 
the number of economic substantive due process cases has had nowhere to 
go but down. 
                                                          
 318. See 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (stating that the word of the United States Supreme Court is 
final in the interpretation of the United States Constitution). 
 319. Coldwell, 712 S.W.2d at 671 n.1.   
 320. Baker v. State, 584 S.W.2d 65, 70-71 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, J., dissenting).   
 321. Id. at 71 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 322. 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980). 
 323. Id. at 948 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).   
 324. 984 P.2d 221 (Ok. Ct. Crim. App. 1999). 
 325. Id. at 244 (Lumpkin, J., concurring).   
 326. Id. at 247 (Lumpkin, J., concurring).   
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This about-face in “conservative” views on substantive due process 
under state constitutional law was merely part of the broader, and well-
recognized, conservative retreat from the doctrine in the wake of Roe v. 
Wade discussed earlier.327  It is also a gross oversimplification of current 
attitudes to judicial review amongst those often labeled “conservative.”  
Legal scholars and jurists who are politically conservative often fall into 
two separate categories when it comes to judicial review:  judicial 
conservatives on one side and a more counter-majoritarian school of 
thought, sometimes called “liberal originalist,”328 on the other.  Therefore, 
“conservative” legal scholars may be conservative on abortion, but still 
advocate heightened judicial review when it comes to economic regulation 
and economic substantive due process.329  This is to say nothing of 
libertarian legal scholars, such as Randy Barnett, who would like to see 
heightened judicial review across the board.330 
The above disclaimer aside, however, nuances among legal scholars are 
not what is at issue when explaining a long-term trend spread across fifty 
different jurisdictions.  The overall effect of Roe v. Wade among 
conservative jurists and scholars has undeniably increased distaste for 
“Lochnerism.”  The effect of Roe, if it did cause the drop in economic 
substantive due process cases in the 1970s and 1980s, did not occur 
immediately.  It is not as though all of the forty-eight cases of the 1970s 
were issued before the date of Roe’s publication.331  However, doctrines do 
not suffer such drops overnight when spread across fifty courts with total 
discretion in the interpretation of their own constitutions.  However, the 
drop, whatever its cause, was huge, and the accompanying conservative 
rejection of heightened judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause cannot be discounted as a meme that may have spread 
across the “conservative” state justices of the land. 
                                                          
 327. See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text (comparing the Roe Court’s 
identification of an unenumerated right and weighing it against public welfare interests to 
the similar method used in Lochner-era economic substantive due process cases). 
 328. See Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism:  A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 489, 490 (2004) (contrasting “conservative originalism” with “liberal 
originalism,” and explaining that liberal originalism incorporates the Declaration of 
Independence, and its underlying political philosophy, into interpreting the Constitution). 
 329. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, America’s “Culture War”—The Sinister Denial of 
Virtue and the Decline of Natural Law, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 183, 191-92 (1993) 
(distinguishing rights derived from natural law from “new” rights, such as the right to an 
abortion). 
 330. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution:  Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35-36 (2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pu 
bs/scr/docs/2003/revolution.pdf (praising the Supreme Court for applying a “presumption of 
liberty” analysis in its opinion in Lawrence v. Texas). 
 331. See infra Appendix A (listing approximately as many cases from 1970-1973 as 
from 1974-1979). 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to catalog every economic substantive due 
process opinion under state constitutional law since 1940 in state courts of 
highest review.  More importantly, it has analyzed the trends that the 
cataloging reveals.  It has defined “economic substantive due process” 
broadly to include all cases that substantively protect Lockean rights of an 
economic nature, excluding cases decided under equal protection clauses, 
contracts clauses, takings clauses, and cases involving land use zoning.  
This is the first study that has comprehensively gathered these cases, and its 
findings both confirm and discount past articles on the same subject.  As 
previously recognized, state supreme courts protected economic liberties 
through economic substantive due process under state constitutional law 
after the close of the Lochner era.  State supreme courts continued use of 
the doctrine through the 1940s, expanded it in the 1950s, and carried it on 
to a great degree in the 1960s.  However, what has not been recognized 
until this Article is that the doctrine declined further in the 1970s and 
nearly collapsed in the 1980s.  Although the doctrine still exists in some 
states, no state supreme court is aggressive in its use, and many states have 
not employed it in protecting economic liberty for decades.332 
The reason for the rapid decline of the doctrine’s use in the 1970s and 
1980s is difficult to determine without further analysis across the fifty 
relevant jurisdictions.  This Article has suggested a cause of the decline.  
Preliminarily, the suggestion best explains the near collapse of the doctrine 
in the 1980s.  The suggestion is that the emergence of the “right to privacy” 
cases in the 1960s and 1970s, especially the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
protection of abortion rights in Roe v. Wade, reversed the lingering respect 
of conservative state jurists for substantive due process.  Within a few years 
of the decision’s issuance, as is evident in the drop in the number of cases 
alone, many conservative state justices joined with their liberal 
counterparts in condemning the use of economic substantive due process.  
The doctrine, although it had robustly persisted for over thirty years since 
the fall of “Lochnerism,” fell into near disuse because there was almost no 
one left to defend it. 
                                                          
 332. See infra Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX  A 
Cases in which state courts of highest review have protected economic 
liberty through applying economic substantive due process, as that doctrine 
is defined in this Article, under state constitutional law since 1940. 
Alabama 
City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525, 528 
( Ala. 1980) (concluding that a blasting ordinance was unconstitutional). 
White v. Associated Indus. of Ala., Inc., 373 So. 2d 616, 620 
( Ala. 1979) (concluding that a law requiring employers to pay National 
Guard employees double pay during service violates state due process and 
contracts clauses). 
Estell v. City of Birmingham, 286 So. 2d 872, 876 ( Ala. 1973) 
(finding an anti-scalping law to be not affected with a public interest, and 
thus unconstitutional in the limitations it places on ticket resellers). 
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So. 2d 797, 799 ( Ala. 
1962) (determining fair trade regulation unconstitutional). 
Ala. Indep. Serv. Stations Ass’n v. Hunter, 31 So. 2d 571, 574 ( Ala. 
1947) (holding the selling of gasoline is not an industry affected with the 
“public interest”). 
Lisenba v. Griffin, 8 So. 2d 175, 177 ( Ala. 1942) (ruling that a 
barbering licensing board is unconstitutional because barbering is not a 
business “affected with the public interest”). 
Ala. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n v. McDowell, 6 So. 2d 502, 507 ( Ala. 
1942) (holding the banning of advertising of sales-below-cost 
unconstitutional). 
Alaska 
None. 
Arizona 
Visco v. State ex rel. Pickrell, 388 P.2d 155, 165 (Ariz. 1963) (nullifying 
a grant of monopoly in a garbage collection business). 
Killingsworth v. W. Way Motors, Inc., 347 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Ariz. 1959) 
(finding “no reasonable relationship between the requirement that a [car] 
dealer must have a building on the premises containing a display room for 
at least two new cars of the type he is selling and the alleged purpose of the 
legislation . . .”). 
State v. A. J. Bayless Mkts., Inc., 342 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Ariz. 1959) 
(declaring that a ban on selling of imitation ice cream was 
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unconstitutional). 
Findley v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mohave County, 230 P.2d 526, 531 
(Ariz. 1951) (concluding that a rule that restricts a doctor’s use of a county 
hospital if the doctor fails to give assistance at the request of another doctor 
to be unconstitutional). 
Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 231 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Ariz. 
1951) (determining the regulation of prices barbers may charge offends due 
process). 
Buehman v. Bechtel, 114 P.2d 227, 232 (Ariz. 1941) (labeling favoritism 
in a photographer licensing regulation as “arbitrary” and therefore 
unconstitutional). 
Arkansas 
Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark. 
1996) (striking down, as a violation of substantive due process, an anti-
predatory pricing law that failed to require a showing of predatory intent). 
Handy Dan Imp. Ctr., Inc. v. Adams, 633 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ark. 1982) 
(determining that a Sunday closing law violates substantive due process). 
Hand v. H & R Block, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Ark. 1975) 
(concluding that a franchise regulation was effectively a minimum price 
requirement and beyond the state’s police power). 
City of Blytheville v. Thompson, 491 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Ark. 1973) 
(affirming the trial court’s holding that a decision was arbitrary and outside 
of the police power). 
McCastlain v. R. & B. Tobacco Co., 411 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1967) 
(determining that a regulation requiring a cigarette wholesaler to obtain a 
letter of credit offends the state constitution’s individual liberty clause). 
Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Ark. 1962) (finding a 
regulation arbitrary and unreasonable, because it forbids a  landowner from 
maintaining “more than 5 non-usable cars in open view within 500 feet of 
the highway”). 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 275 S.W.2d 
455, 461 (Ark. 1955) (striking down a non-signer clause of the Fair Trade 
Act). 
Wilkins v. City of Harrison, 236 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Ark. 1951) (ruling an 
anti-soliciting ordinance unconstitutional, because it had no reasonable 
relationship to a proper exercise of the police power). 
N. Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54 
(Ark. 1944) (striking down a taxi licensing scheme as a violation of the 
state constitution’s anti-monopoly clause). 
Noble v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Ark. 1942) (ruling barbering 
regulations unconstitutional for violating substantive due process). 
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California 
Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512, 521 (Cal. 1978) (determining that a 
cumulative fining scheme penalizing a landlord violates substantive due 
process). 
Walsh v. Kirby, 529 P.2d 33, 42 (Cal. 1974) (concluding the penalty for 
selling alcohol under a minimum price was so large that it violated due 
process). 
State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29, 36 
(Cal. 1953) (ruling dry cleaning minimum price scheme violates due 
process). 
Colorado 
City of Denver v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 484, 486 (Colo. 1977) (determining 
that a mixed-sex massage ban violates substantive due process, because it 
makes a conclusive presumption). 
People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 P.2d 940, 945 
(Colo. 1971) (concluding that the Filled Dairy Products Act, which 
outlawed vegetable substitute for sour cream, violated substantive due 
process). 
City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 422 P.2d 384, 387-88 (Colo. 1966) 
(ruling that a gasoline delivery ordinance violates substantive due process). 
Abdoo v. City & County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 1964) 
(striking down a photographer licensing ordinance). 
Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo. 1961) (concluding a 
licensing scheme requiring funeral directors to be qualified embalmers to 
be beyond the police power). 
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139, 152 (Colo. 1956) 
(determining that a “non-signer” clause in the Colorado Fair Trade Act 
violated substantive due process). 
Battaglia v. Moore, 261 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Colo. 1953) (ruling that denial 
of a barber license violates the right to follow a lawful calling). 
City of Denver v. Thrailkill, 244 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Colo. 1952) (striking 
down an ordinance requiring taxicab drivers to either own their vehicle or 
be employed by the owner of the vehicle). 
Connecticut 
Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08 
(Conn. 1994) (invalidating, on substantive due process grounds, a 
mandatory Sunday closing law for motor vehicle dealerships). 
Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 417 A.2d 343, 354 (Conn. 1979) 
(invalidating a mandatory Sunday closing law for retail establishments, 
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because it violates substantive due process). 
Mott’s Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961) 
(striking down a statute forbidding advertising of items sold below cost). 
United Interchange, Inc. v. Spellacy, 136 A.2d 801, 806 (Conn. 1957) 
(invalidating a real estate broker licensing scheme on substantive due 
process grounds). 
Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A.2d 152, 158 (Conn. 1954) (concluding a 
restriction on dental advertising has no reasonable relation to the public 
welfare). 
Gibson v. Board of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 783, 784 (Conn. 
1942) (mandating a grant of license to a funeral director, following Hart v. 
Board of Examiners of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942)). 
Hart v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942) 
(striking down requirement that funeral directors also be licensed 
embalmers). 
State v. Miller, 12 A.2d 192, 194 (Conn. 1940) (concluding that a 
prohibition on gas station price signs is unconstitutional). 
Delaware 
Green v. Mid-Penn Nat’l Mortg. Co., 268 A.2d 876, 877 (Del. 1970) 
(holding that an in-state residency requirement for a majority of 
stockholders is “not a valid exercise of police power since its residence 
requirements bear no reasonable relation to the prevention of fraud or other 
protection of the public”). 
Rogers v. State, 199 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964) (invalidating a Sunday 
closing law for barbers on substantive due process grounds). 
State v. Hobson, 83 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Del. 1951) (striking down a 
statute regulating size of gas station signs). 
Florida 
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So. 2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. 2000) 
(concluding an anti-rebate statute regarding title insurance agents’ 
commissions violates substantive due process). 
In re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So. 2d 233, 236 (Fla. 1992) 
(using heightened scrutiny to determine that a statute allowing the state to 
confiscate certain airline engines violates substantive due process). 
Dep’t of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate’s Office, 492 So. 2d 
1032, 1035 (Fla. 1986) (concluding an anti-rebate statute regarding 
insurance agents’ commissions violates substantive due process). 
State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (Fla. 1986) (striking down a statute 
criminalizing the possession of embossing machines on substantive due 
process grounds). 
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Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering, 397 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla. 1981) (holding that a permit scheme 
deducting one percent of race winnings and transferring funds to private 
associations is an invalid exercise of the state police power). 
Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479, 484-85 (Fla. 1979) 
(determining that a tax statute violates due process, because it creates an 
irrebuttable presumption that an agricultural landowner who files a 
subdivision plat no longer has lower-tax agricultural land). 
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So. 2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 1976) 
(concluding that energy price restrictions are unconstitutional because, inter 
alia, they exceed the state’s police power). 
Castlewood Int’l Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1974) 
(concluding that a statute that requires alcohol sales only be made in cash 
was unconstitutional under substantive due process). 
Hilaleah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 
625, 628-29 (Fla. 1971) (striking down a statute regulating race track 
operating days according to the amount of tax revenue the track produced 
in the preceding year for violating substantive due process). 
Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb’s City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681, 681-82 (Fla. 
1969) (relying on Stadnik v. Shell’s City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962), 
to strike down a ban on advertising prescription drugs). 
Rabin v. Conner, 174 So. 2d 721, 726 (Fla. 1965) (invalidating celery 
marketing scheme for violating substantive due process). 
Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1963) 
(invalidating an ordinance banning outdoor advertising of lodging 
accommodations). 
Delmonico v. State, 155 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963) (concluding that a 
ban on the possession of spearfishing equipment exceeds the police power). 
Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1963) (concluding 
an education requirement for masseurs was an invalid use of the police 
power). 
Stadnik v. Shell’s City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962) (holding a 
regulation banning the advertising of prescription drugs to have no rational 
basis). 
Moore v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961) (determining that a 
Sunday closing law for automobile dealers exceeds the police power). 
State v. Leone, 118 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1960) (striking down a 
requirement that a drug store have a licensed pharmacist on duty while 
open, even when not preparing and selling “controlled drugs and 
medicines”). 
Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 192 (Fla. 1958) (concluding that an act 
that banned solicitation by public adjusters violated the police power). 
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State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So. 2d 19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958) 
(invalidating a statute barring roadside signs advertising gas prices). 
Fla. Accountants Ass’n v. Dandelake, 98 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1957) 
(“[T]o prohibit non-certified accountants in this state from doing routine 
accounting work in their own offices, rather than in that of an ‘employer,’ 
and to require them to designate themselves as ‘bookkeepers’ rather than as 
accountants, ‘is in conflict with the spirit and express provision of the 
Constitution and void . . . .’”). 
Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So. 2d 188, 192-93 (Fla. 1955) 
(determining that an ordinance regulating the size of gas station signs 
exceeds the police power). 
Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954) (invaliding a 
non-signer clause of state Fair Trade Act). 
Lee v. Shobe, 66 So. 2d 256, 256 (Fla. 1953) (invalidating a regulation 
banning real estate salesmen from working part-time). 
Lee v. Delmar, 66 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953) (invalidating a regulation 
banning real estate salesmen from working part-time). 
Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik, 57 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1952) 
(concluding that an ordinance restricting construction to certain times of 
the year exceeds the police power). 
City of Miami v. Shell’s Super Store, 50 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1951) 
(striking down a restriction on barbering hours as beyond the valid exercise 
of the police power). 
Liquor Store v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 385 (Fla. 1949) 
(invalidating the Fair Trade Act as “arbitrary and unreasonable”). 
Sullivan v. DeCerb, 23 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945) (holding that a 
photography licensing scheme is beyond the proper exercise of the police 
power). 
Scarborough v. Webb’s Cut Rate Drug Co., Inc., 8 So. 2d 913, 922 (Fla. 
1942) (concluding that the Fair Trade Act regulating wholesale and retail 
prices violates substantive due process). 
Georgia 
Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. 1987) 
(invalidating the Below Sales Cost Act, because the oil industry is not 
affected with the public interest). 
Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ga. 1986) 
(concluding a gasoline price-fixing statute violates substantive due process, 
because the gasoline industry is not affected with the public interest). 
Strickland v. Rio Stores, Inc., 255 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. 1979) 
(concluding a prohibition on below-cost tobacco sales violates substantive 
due process). 
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Georgia Franchise Practices Comm’n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 262 
S.E.2d 106, 108 (1979) (“The cited sections violate the due process clause 
by seeking to regulate an industry not affected with a public interest . . . 
and by restricting competition.”). 
Ward v. Big Apple Super Mkts., 158 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Ga. 1967) 
(holding a milk price-fixing scheme unconstitutional under substantive due 
process). 
Williams v. Hirsch, 87 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 1955) (striking down a tobacco 
price-fixing provision as a violation of substantive due process). 
Cox v. Gen. Elec. Co., 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ga. 1955) (finding the state 
Fair Trade Act unconstitutional under substantive due process). 
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 75 S.E.2d 161, 165 (Ga. 
1953) (finding the state Fair Trade Act unconstitutional under substantive 
due process). 
Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 694-95 (Ga. 1951) (determining that a 
milk price-fixing statute was unconstitutional). 
Hawaii 
None. 
Idaho 
Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Trenhaile, 486 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Idaho 
1971) (striking down a statute banning “filled milk” under substantive due 
process). 
Winther v. Village of Weippe, 430 P.2d 689, 695 (Idaho 1967) (striking 
down an ordinance limiting the number of beer-selling licenses as violating 
substantive due process). 
Berry v. Summers, 283 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho 1955) (determining a 
requirement that “dental mechanics or technicians” be licensed as dentists 
was unconstitutional). 
O’Connor v. City of Moscow, 202 P.2d 401, 404 (Idaho 1949) 
(invalidating an ordinance, on substantive due process grounds, barring a 
pool-hall owner from selling the business and allowing it to continue 
running as a pool-hall). 
Illinois 
People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 768-69 (Ill. 2000) (invalidating a 
statute penalizing an auto recycling owner for not keeping accurate records 
even absent criminal intent). 
Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580 (Ill. 1995) (determining a private 
alarm contractor licensing scheme unconstitutional as invalid use of the 
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police power). 
People v. Hamm, 595 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ill. 1992) (concluding that a 
requirement that commercial fishermen tag their nets and have immediate 
possession of fishing licenses violates substantive due process). 
People v. Johnson, 369 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977) (holding that a 
plumbing licensing scheme, as implemented, created an unconstitutional 
monopoly power in the hands of already licensed plumbers). 
Cook County v. Priester, 342 N.E.2d 41, 48 (Ill. 1976) (determining that 
restrictions on a private airport runway were unconstitutional). 
People v. Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971) (striking down a 
plumbing licensing law). 
Shoot v. Ill. Liquor Control Comm’n, 198 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ill. 1964) 
(declaring a requirement that liquor businesses purchase a gaming stamp 
unconstitutional). 
City Sav. Ass’n v. Int’l Guar. & Ins. Co., 162 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ill. 1959) 
(determining that a prohibition on certain savings and loans from obtaining 
insurance has no reasonable basis). 
Gholson v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ill. 1956) (striking down a 
regulation on substantive due process grounds, and concluding “[t]he 
record does not, in our opinion, establish that public health considerations 
justify the requirement that a funeral director be a licensed embalmer”). 
Wolford v. City of Chicago, 138 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ill. 1956) (concluding 
that an ordinance requiring prospective gas station owners to obtain the 
consent of neighboring property owners is “arbitrary and unreasonable”). 
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill. 
1955) (determining a “pay-while-voting” statute “has no real or substantial 
relation to the object of public welfare” and therefore is an unconstitutional 
use of the police power). 
Figura v. Cummins, 122 N.E.2d 162, 166 (Ill. 1954) (ruling that a ban on 
the manufacture of metal springs in residences is not in “the proper domain 
of the police power”). 
Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E.2d 169, 170-73 (Ill. 1953) (striking down a 
plumbing licensing law as an improper exercise of the police power). 
People v. Brown, 95 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1950) (striking down various 
arduous plumbing licensing restrictions as violating substantive due 
process). 
N. Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 72 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ill. 1947) (striking 
down a strip-mining regulation because it was not reasonably related to a 
legitimate purpose). 
Metro. Trust Co. v. Jones, 51 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ill. 1943) (concluding 
that a provision of the Small Loans Act, which restricts the transferability 
of a note, violates substantive due process). 
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Indiana 
Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) 
(striking down a bar on automobile dealers also selling auto insurance on 
grounds that there was no “good cause” for the law). 
Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952) (declaring 
that price restrictions on automobile dealers are not a valid use of the police 
power). 
Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1949) (concluding that an anti-
scalping law “cannot be justified as a proper exercise of police power”). 
Dep’t of Ins. v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. 1947) (striking 
down a requirement that insurance agents be paid by commission because 
the law has “no substantial relation to the police power”). 
State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Cloud, 44 N.E.2d 972, 979 (Ind. 1942) 
(holding barbering restrictions unconstitutional because barbering is “not 
affected with a public interest”). 
Needham v. Proffit, 41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942) (concluding that a 
ban on print advertisements of funeral directors and embalmers is 
unconstitutional). 
Iowa 
Pierce v. Inc. Town of La Porte City, 146 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1966) 
(declaring that an ordinance, relating to trailer parks and  adopted under 
general police powers, violates substantive due process). 
Cent. States Theatre Corp. v. Sar, 66 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1954) 
(striking down a movie house licensing ordinance for violating due 
process). 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 65 N.W.2d 410, 419 (Iowa 1954) 
(invalidating an anti-trading stamp regulation as not a legitimate use of the 
police power). 
City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1942) (striking down an 
anti-door-to-door salesman ordinance as an unreasonable exercise of the 
police power). 
Kansas 
City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 598 P.2d 1051, 1061 (Kan. 1979) 
(declaring that a bar on curtains and screens in saloon windows would not 
promote the general welfare). 
Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Prairie Village, 491 P.2d 910, 913 
(Kan. 1971) (striking down a city ban on selling goods from vehicles 
between seven o’clock a.m. and nine o’clock p.m. because it has the effect 
of prohibiting an ice cream truck business). 
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Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 
1969) (holding that the absolute prohibition of “huckstering and peddling” 
is beyond the police power). 
Sunflower Tip Top Dairies Co. v. City of Russell, 362 P.2d 76, 80 (Kan. 
1961) (concluding that a permitting scheme for milk producers violated 
substantive due process). 
Gilbert v. Mathews, 352 P.2d 58, 69 (Kan. 1960) (striking down a public 
auction law because it was “designed to be so oppressive and unreasonable 
that it prohibit[ed] the conduct of such lawful business”). 
State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959) 
(declaring a milk sales law unconstitutional where legislation criminalized 
selling below cost even when the seller lacked the intent to sell below cost). 
Kentucky 
Remote Servs., Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989) 
(striking down a minimum mark-up law as facially unconstitutional under 
the Absolute and Arbitrary Power Clause). 
Kentucky Milk Marketing and Antimonopoly Comm’n v. Kroger Co., 
691 S.W.2d 893, 900-01 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a Milk Marketing Law 
Commission’s refusal to accept a milk seller’s price per gallon was 
“arbitrary and capricious”). 
U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Res. Co. v. City of Beattyville, 548 
S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. 1977) (holding that a coal tipple may not be 
completely prohibited). 
Johnson v. City of Paducah, 512 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky. 1974) (striking 
down an ordinance mandating the destruction of property without giving 
the owner reasonable time to make repairs). 
Adams, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 439 S.W.2d 
586, 592 (Ky. 1969) (striking down a requirement that all swimming pools, 
regardless of type, have a lifeguard on duty at all times as an unreasonable 
exercise of the police power). 
Roe v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky. 1966) (concluding that 
regulations on nudist colonies requiring a twenty-foot-high wall and a 
licensing fee are an unreasonable exercise of the police power). 
Bruner v. City of Danville, 394 S.W.2d 939, 943-44 (Ky. 1965) (holding 
that a denial of a dancing hall permit was arbitrary use of the police power). 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Corp., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. 1958) 
(declaring the Fair Trade Act non-signer clause to be “a legislative invasion 
of the broad constitutional liberty of the people to acquire and protect their 
property and engage in free trade”). 
Marshall v. City of Louisville, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1951) 
(striking down an ordinance requiring all signs to be electrified and 
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illuminated until ten o’clock p.m.). 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 976, 976, (Ky. 1947) 
(permitting employer to deduct employee’s wages when voting, following 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Com., 204 S.W.2d 973 ( Ky. 1947)). 
Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 973, 975 (Ky. 1947) 
(striking down a law mandating employers pay workers for time taken off 
to vote). 
Kenton & Campbell Burial Ass’n v. Goodpaster, 200 S.W.2d 120, 124 
(Ky. 1946) (concluding that a bar on making insurance contracts with 
undertakers is arbitrary). 
City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky. 
1944) (determining an ordinance preventing a restaurant from opening 
between midnight and four o’clock a.m. is arbitrary and unreasonable). 
City of Mount Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 
(Ky. 1941) (holding an anti-door-to-door salesman ordinance to be an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power). 
City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 145 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Ky. 1940) (striking 
down a limitation on hours of that barbershops may keep because it was 
found to be arbitrary). 
Louisiana 
City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1986) (striking 
down a bar on journeyman plumbers engaging in plumbing repairs). 
City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (La. 1978) (declaring 
that a ban on frog gigging for eleven months out of the year violates 
substantive due process). 
City of Crowley Firemen v. City of Crowley, 280 So. 2d 897, 902 (La. 
1973) (declaring that a prohibition on outside employment by city firemen 
violates substantive due process). 
West v. Town of Winnsboro, 211 So. 2d 665, 672, (La. 1967) (declaring 
a Sunday closing law to have no reasonable basis). 
City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So. 2d 747, 749 (La. 1964) (striking 
down a ban on advertising gasoline prices as a restriction that violates 
substantive due process). 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 117 So. 2d 64, 66 (La. 
1960) (striking down a ban on advertising gasoline prices as a restriction 
that violates substantive due process). 
City of Lake Charles v. Hasha, 116 So. 2d 277, 280-81 (La. 1959) 
(concluding a size restriction on gas station signs is an unreasonable use of 
the police power). 
Schwegmann Bros. v. La. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 43 So. 2d 
248, 260 (La. 1949) (declaring that a statute mandating mark-ups on sales 
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of certain classes of alcohol violates substantive due process). 
Maine 
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (holding that a denial of 
permit under the state Wetlands Act violates substantive due process). 
United Interchange, Inc. of Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 
1958) (striking down a bar on real estate advertising in magazines for being 
beyond the police power). 
Opinion of the Justices, 132 A.2d 47, 49 (Me. 1957) (declaring that a 
proposed unfair trade legislation would be unconstitutional, because the 
legislation would criminalize selling below cost even when the seller 
lacked the intent to sell below cost). 
State v. Union Oil Co., 120 A.2d 708, 713 (Me. 1956) (concluding that a 
restriction on the size of gas station price signs violates substantive due 
process). 
Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A.2d 289, 291 (Me. 1956) (declaring 
that a below-cost sales law violates substantive due process in as much as it 
makes a sale below cost prima facie evidence). 
Maryland 
Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 311 A.2d 242, 252 (Md. 1973) 
(declaring a ban on the advertising of drug prices to be an unconstitutional 
exercise of the police power). 
Md. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Kuhn, 312 A.2d 216, 225 (Md. 
1973) (striking down a law preventing cosmetologists from cutting male 
hair in the same manner as they cut female hair). 
Bruce v. Dir., Dep’t of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 276 A.2d 200, 209 (Md. 
1971) (concluding that a regulation mandating that crab fishermen only fish 
in their own county is not a reasonable exercise of the police power). 
City of Baltimore v. Charles Ctr. Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144, 147-48 
(Md. 1970) (declaring an ordinance banning painted signs but allowing 
billboards, to be “arbitrary and unreasonable”). 
Loughran v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 12 A.2d 201, 207 
(Md. 1940) (striking down a provision of Fair Trade Act banning below 
cost sales as unconstitutional). 
Middleman v. Davis, 12 A.2d 208, 208 (Md. 1940) (same holding as 
Loughran). 
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Massachusetts 
Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 
1970) (holding that maximum rates set for compulsory auto insurance were 
confiscatory and thus unconstitutionally low). 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass. 
1970) (same holding as Traveler’s Indem. Co.). 
Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 289 
(Mass. 1965) (“[T]here is no rational basis for prohibiting the sale of 
Coffee-Rich, an admittedly nutritious product which is distinctively 
labeled.”). 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Mass. 1958) (stating 
that a proposed regulation on the hours barbers may keep would violate 
economic liberties). 
Mansfield Beauty Acad., Inc. v. Bd. of Registration of Hairdressers, 96 
N.E.2d 145, 147 (Mass. 1951) (striking down a bar on beauty schools 
accepting payment for hairdressing students rendering services). 
Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948) (stating that a 
proposed bill barring cemetery owners and operators from selling cemetery 
monuments would be an invalid exercise of the police power). 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 30 N.E.2d 269, 276 (Mass. 1940) 
(declaring that a bar on exchanging trading stamps for gasoline void as “an 
arbitrary interference with business and an irrational and unnecessary 
restriction”). 
Michigan 
Grocers Dairy Co. v. McIntyre, 138 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Mich. 1966) 
(striking down a ban on one gallon milk containers as violating substantive 
due process). 
Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 54 
N.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Mich. 1952) (holding that a non-signer clause of the 
Fair Trade Act violates substantive due process). 
Levy v. Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951) (striking down a 
restriction on the size of gasoline price signs as violating substantive due 
process). 
Minnesota 
Fairmont Foods Co. v. City of Duluth, 110 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Minn. 
1961) (striking down limitations on production of milk with a certain 
bacterial count as violating substantive due process). 
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Mississippi 
Goodin v. City of Philadelphia, 75 So. 2d 279, 280 (Miss. 1954) (holding 
that a ban on operating a business after ten o’clock p.m. does not further 
the public interest). 
Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., 43 So. 2d 184, 190-91 (Miss. 1949) 
(holding that the application of a use tax for an out-of-state corporation 
violates substantive due process). 
King v. City of Louisville, 42 So. 2d 813, 816 (Miss. 1949) (concluding 
that effective prohibition of fireworks sales is unreasonable). 
Moore v. Grillis, 39 So. 2d 505, 509, 512 (Miss. 1949) (striking down a 
ban on unlicensed public accountants preparing tax returns as not a 
“reasonable exercise of the police power”). 
McCool v. Blaine, 11 So. 2d 801, 802 (Miss. 1943) (holding that an 
ordinance restricting the opening of businesses past eleven o’clock p.m. 
violates substantive due process). 
Saucier v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 198 So. 625, 629 (Miss. 1940) 
(striking down a statute making insurance company special agents into 
general agents because it has “[no] imaginable legitimate legislative end”). 
Missouri 
Blue Inv. Co. v. City of Raytown, 478 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1972) 
(concluding that a flat charge of $2.50 per room, whether vacant or not, 
violated substantive due process). 
State on Info. of Taylor v. Currency Servs., Inc., 218 S.W.2d 600, 604 
(Mo. 1949) (invalidating law restricting the type of corporation that may 
send money by electronic means as a law granting special rights and 
privileges). 
Heil v. Kauffman, 189 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Mo. 1945) (striking down a ban 
on selling gasoline outside of certain business hours as violating 
substantive due process). 
State v. Taylor, 173 S.W.2d 902, 903, 906 (Mo. 1943) (concluding that a 
regulation limiting women’s working hours to 54 hours per week, and only 
in towns with less than 3,000 residents, violates substantive due process). 
Montana 
Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996) (invalidating, 
under a strict scrutiny analysis, a rule forbidding state employed property 
appraiser from working as an independent realtor as violating right “to 
pursue life’s basic necessities”). 
State ex rel. Schultz-Lindsay Const. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 403 
P.2d 635, 646 (Mont. 1965) (concluding that a tax on nonresident 
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contractors violates substantive due process). 
Garden Spot Mkt., Inc. v. Byrne, 378 P.2d 220, 231 (Mont. 1963) 
(striking down a prohibitively restrictive licensing scheme on trading 
stamps “as an unreasonable exercise of the police power”). 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Ctr., Inc., 359 P.2d 644, 
654 (Mont. 1961) (invalidating a state Fair Trade Act as violating the state 
constitution’s anti-price-fixing provision). 
State v. Canfield, 277 P.2d 534, 534 (Mont. 1954) (relying on State v. 
Gleason, 277 P.2d 530, 533-34 (Mont. 1954), to invalidate a photography 
licensing scheme). 
State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530,533-34 (Mont. 1954) (declaring that a 
photography licensing scheme violates substantive due process). 
Brackman v. Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (Mont. 1948) (declaring a 
prohibitive oleomargarine licensing fee unconstitutional as “excessive, 
confiscatory and prohibitive”). 
Nebraska 
Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb. 
1974) (concluding that a dairy regulation act imposing maximum costs on 
products “is an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual 
liberty”). 
United States Brewers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 220 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Neb. 
1974) (declaring a liquor distribution law to be an “unreasonable invasion 
of the personal and property rights of the plaintiffs”). 
Plucknett v. Morrison, 133 N.W.2d 18, 19 (Neb. 1965) (invalidating a 
Sunday closing law, relying on Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 
475, 481 (Neb. 1964)). 
Skag-Way, Inc. v. Douglas, 133 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Neb. 1965) 
(invalidating a Sunday closing law, relying on Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. 
Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964)). 
Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964) 
(striking down a Sunday closing law only applying to establishments of 
more than two employees as violating substantive due process). 
Skag-Way Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 125 N.W.2d 529, 
541 (Neb. 1964) (concluding that a Sunday closing law violates substantive 
due process). 
Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 234-35 (Neb. 1960) 
(striking down a milk-regulation law as violating substantive due process). 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 68 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Neb. 
1955) (relying on McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 68 
N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955), in striking down the Fair Trade Act). 
McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 721-22, 
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68 N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955) (striking down the Fair Trade Act on 
grounds that it violates substantive due process). 
City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 53 N.W.2d 543, 550 
(Neb. 1952) (concluding that a regulation on pipes used by a canal 
company violated substantive due process). 
Boomer v. Olsen, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Neb. 1943) (“[T]he provision 
fixing the maximum fee to be charged by a private employment agency, to 
an amount equivalent to ten per cent. [sic] of the first month’s salary, is 
unreasonable, prohibitory and confiscatory . . . .”). 
Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 3 N.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Neb. 1942) 
(concluding that regulations restricting the timing of auctions “arbitrarily 
and unreasonably interfere with private business and impose unreasonable 
and unnecessary restrictions on auction sales”). 
Golden v. Bartholomew, 299 N.W. 356, 362 (Neb. 1941) (declaring that 
a requirement that funeral directors carry a certain amount of caskets in 
stock is arbitrary and an unreasonable and unconstitutional exercise of the 
police power). 
Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 291 N.W. 664, 670 (Neb. 1940) 
(holding that an ordinance outlawing peddling as a nuisance is outside of 
the exercise of the police power). 
Nevada 
In re Martin, 504 P.2d 14, 16 (Nev. 1972) (striking down an ordinance 
banning delivery of gasoline to underground storage facilities by vehicles 
holding over 2,000 gallons as violating substantive due process). 
Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 396 P.2d 683, 693 (Nev. 
1964) (concluding that the Fair Trade Act is an unlawful exercise of the 
police power). 
State v. Redman Petroleum Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 845, 846 (Nev. 1961) 
(holding that restrictions on the size of gasoline station signs violate 
substantive due process). 
New Hampshire 
State v. Moore, 13 A.2d 143, 148 (N.H. 1940) (striking down a trucking 
licensing scheme as arbitrary and unreasonable). 
New Jersey 
State v. Boston Juvenile Shoes, 288 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1972) (striking 
down an ordinance licensing fee regulating interior window signs as too 
burdensome for the stated legislative end of visibility into commercial 
premises). 
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Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 154 A.2d 9, 21 (N.J. 1959) (ruling that a 
requirement that solicitors submit a “freedom from disease” statement in 
obtaining a soliciting license is “an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of 
the police power”). 
Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 120 A.2d 114, 118 (N.J. 1956) (“[W]e hold 
the ordinance in question, exacting a license fee of $100 for each milk 
vending machine, is unreasonable, discriminatory and confiscatory . . . .”). 
Lane Distribs. v. Tilton, 81 A.2d 786, 796 (N.J. 1951) (concluding that 
the Tax Act and Unfair Cigarette Sales Act are arbitrary and 
discriminatory). 
Lakewood Express Serv. v. Bd. of Pub. Utility Comm’rs, 61 A.2d 730, 
734 (N.J. 1948) (striking down a bar on sedan hire cars as violating 
substantive due process). 
Hart v. Teaneck Township, 50 A.2d 856, 857-58 (N.J. 1947) (concluding 
that an ordinance prohibiting the operation of lunch wagons from 1 a.m. 
until 7 a.m. is unreasonable). 
N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, 
11 A.2d 113, 118 (N.J. 1940) (determining that an anti-peddling ordinance 
is an abuse of the police power). 
New Mexico 
Drink, Inc. v. Babcock, 421 P.2d 798, 803 (N.M. 1966) (striking down 
non-signer and mandatory markup provisions of the Liquor Fair Trade Act 
as violating substantive due process). 
Skaggs Drug Ctr. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 P.2d 967, 974 (N.M. 1957) 
(concluding that a non-signer provision of the Fair Trade Act “is 
unconstitutional and void as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the 
police power”). 
New York 
People v. Bunis, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274 (N.Y. 1961) (striking down a 
blanket ban on sale of coverless magazines as outside the exercise of the 
police power). 
Trio Distrib. Corp. v. City of Albany, 143 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (N.Y. 
1957) (concluding an ordinance requiring peddlers selling to children to 
employ a safety guard to be an invalid exercise of the police power). 
Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. DuMond, 132 N.E.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. 1956) 
(ruling that a ban on the sale of containers of evaporated filled milk of less 
than ten pounds violates substantive due process). 
Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 
1943) (striking down an anti-peddling law as violating substantive due 
process). 
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North Carolina 
Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 360 S.E.2d 783, 786 (N.C. 1987) 
(striking down ordinance banning “companionship” businesses because the 
language is overbroad and therefore is not “rationally related to a 
substantial government purpose”). 
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498, 506 (N.C. 1976) 
(striking down an insurance law mandating that insurers in other fields 
provide medical insurance for violating the state’s Law of the Land 
Clause). 
Bulva Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 
1974) (declaring the Fair Trade Act to violate the state’s Law of the Land 
Clause). 
In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729 
(N.C. 1973) (concluding that a property owner may not be denied the right 
to construct a hospital on its own property, as a restriction that violates the 
state’s Law of the Land Clause). 
State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293, 299 (N.C. 1965) (striking down a 
Sunday closing law that only applies to nightclubs as violating substantive 
due process). 
State v. Byrd, 130 S.E.2d 55, 59 (N.C. 1963) (holding that an ordinance 
banning the operation of ice cream vans is an invalid use of the police 
power). 
Little Pep Delmonico Rest., Inc. v. Charlotte, 113 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C. 
1960) (striking down an ordinance restricting the use of business signs as 
unreasonable), overruled by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 
1982). 
State ex rel. Utilities Com. v. Atl. Greyhound Corp., 113 S.E.2d 57, 61 
(N.C. 1960) (holding that a regulation restricting the choices of common 
carriers over tickets and agents violates the right to earn a living). 
State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. 1959) (striking down 
restrictions on the operation of junk yards on the grounds that the law was 
only justified on aesthetic grounds, and such grounds are not enough to 
invoke the police power), overruled by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 
(N.C. 1982). 
Winston-Salem v. S. Ry. Co., 105 S.E.2d 37, 52 (N.C. 1958) (holding 
that an ordinance forcing a railroad company to pay for rebuilding a trestle 
violates the state’s Law of the Land Clause). 
Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957) (concluding that a 
scheme licensing tile contractors violates the state’s Law of the Land 
Clause). 
State v. Balance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. 1949) (striking 
down a photography licensing scheme as violating the state’s Law of the 
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Land Clause). 
State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 886 (N.C. 1940) (determining that a dry 
cleaning licensing scheme is an illegitimate exercise of the police power). 
North Dakota 
Fairmont Foods v. Burgum, 81 N.W.2d 639, 647 (N.D. 1957) (striking 
down dairy industry regulations for violating substantive due process). 
State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 (N.D. 1943) (concluding that a 
photography licensing law violates substantive due process). 
Ohio 
Hausman v. City of Dayton, 653 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 1995) 
(holding that an ordinance imposing a duty to prevent a nuisance on non-
possessory mortgagee was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional). 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 147 N.E.2d 481, 
484 (Ohio 1958) (striking down a non-signer clause of the Fair Trade Act 
as violating substantive due process). 
Frost Bar v. City of Shaker Heights, 141 N.E.2d 245, 246 (Ohio 1957) 
(concluding that an ordinance banning mobile food venders is an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power). 
Bellevue v. Hopps, 132 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ohio 1956) (determining that 
an ordinance restricting heavy trucks to driving in the extreme right lane is 
unreasonable). 
Frecker v. Dayton, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ohio 1950) (holding that an 
ordinance licensing mobile food vendors is unreasonable). 
Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947) (determining 
that the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act does not take into account different 
operating costs amongst wholesalers, and therefore violates substantive due 
process). 
City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ohio 1943) (striking 
down an ordinance regulating barber shop hours as an invalid exercise of 
the police power). 
Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ohio 
1941) (concluding that an ordinance imposing reporting requirements on 
plumbers is “unduly oppressive upon individuals”). 
Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941) (holding that a ban on 
the advertising of barbering prices interferes with property rights). 
Oklahoma 
Spartan’s Indus., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 
1972) (declaring a Sunday closing ordinance is not a legitimate exercise of 
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the police power). 
Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 
(Okla. 1971) (concluding that licensing procedures for psychologists were 
unduly restrictive). 
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297, 303 (Okla. 
1961) (holding that the Fair Trade Act non-signer clause violates 
substantive due process). 
Okla. City v. Poor, 298 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Okla. 1956) (concluding that 
an ordinance restricting the selling of raw milk to those licensed by the city 
violates substantive due process). 
State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 248 P.2d 612, 615 (Okla. 1952) (striking 
down a watchmaking licensing scheme for violating substantive due 
process). 
City of Guthrie v. Pike & Long, 206 Okla. 307, 243 P.2d 697, 701 
(1952) (concluding that ordinance licensing retail establishments was 
arbitrary). 
Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 1949) (striking down a 
law banning below-cost sales as violating substantive due process, because 
the law included sales made without intent to harm competitors). 
Oregon 
Leathers v. City of Burns, 444 P.2d 1010, 1015, 1018 (Or. 1968) 
(striking down an ordinance banning the use of underground gasoline 
storage tanks in excess of 3,000 gallons as violating substantive due 
process). 
Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 341 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Or. 1959) (concluding that 
a law requiring a permit in order to rent delivery vehicles was 
unconstitutional because it furthered a monopoly). 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956) (holding a non-
signer clause of the Fair Trade Act unreasonable). 
Pennsylvania 
Nixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003) 
(concluding that a law restricting recently released criminals from working 
in nursing homes “unconstitutionally infringes on the Employees’ right to 
pursue an occupation”). 
Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490, 495 (Pa. 1971) 
(striking down a ban on the advertisement of “dangerous drugs” for 
violating substantive due process under the state constitution). 
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 182 
(Pa. 1967) (declaring that an ordinance completely banning the operation of 
quarries inside of a town violates substantive due process). 
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Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. 1959) (determining that an 
ordinance banning the importation of garbage into a town is arbitrary and 
unreasonable). 
Warren v. Phila., 127 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. 1956) (holding that the city’s 
rent control ordinance was not justified by the police power and was 
therefore “invalid, arbitrary, and void”). 
Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 116 A.2d 833, 
840 (Pa. 1955) (concluding that the application of state Ice Cream Law to 
malt products is an unreasonable exercise of the police power). 
Cott Beverage Corp. v. Horst, 110 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1955) (striking down a 
ban on the use of an artificial sweetener in non-alcoholic drinks as violating 
the state constitution’s protection of property rights). 
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 638 (Pa. 1954) (“We hold 
that the provision of the statute forbidding price signs in excess of the size 
therein prescribed violates” state constitution protection of property rights). 
Otto Milk Co. v. Rose, 99 A.2d 467, 472-73 (Pa. 1953) (ruling that an 
ordinance requiring that all of a milk producer’s suppliers be inspected 
violated state constitution’s protection of property rights). 
Olan Mills, Inc. v. Sharon, 92 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. 1952) (holding that a 
photography licensing ordinance was an improper use of the police power 
as it was in effect a revenue measure). 
Girard Trust Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 73 A.2d 371, 371 (Pa. 1950), aff’g 
Girard Trust Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. 533, 537 (Pa. C.P. 1950) 
(invalidating a statute cutting off the right to collect rent payments after 
fifty years as violating substantive due process). 
In re Borsch Estate, 67 A.2d 119, 123 (Pa. 1949) (striking down a 
statute, as it applies retroactively, allowing beneficiaries of spendthrift 
trusts to renounce such trusts in order to vest the trust’s property in a 
remainderman as violating substantive due process). 
Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 58 A.2d 464, 475 (Pa. 1948) 
(holding that a requirement that automobile rental company obtain a 
“certificate of public convenience” violates substantive due process). 
Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521, 528 (Pa. 1947) 
(determining that a community property law, when retroactively applied to 
property spouses acquired before the law’s passage, violated substantive 
due process). 
Flynn v. Horst, 51 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. 1947) (determining the  licensing of 
the sale of oleomargarine violates substantive due process). 
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940) (declaring the Fair 
Sale Act unconstitutional under state Declaration of Rights). 
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Rhode Island 
None. 
South Carolina 
Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 
1967) (holding a milk price-control law to be unconstitutional), overruled 
by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 
(S.C. 2000) (rejecting the “affected with a public interest” approach in 
favor of an approach upholding regulations with a rational relationship to 
the intended legislative purpose). 
Stone v. Salley, 137 S.E.2d 788, 793 (S.C. 1964) (holding a milk price-
control law to violate substantive due process), overruled by R.L. Jordan 
Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000). 
Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 680 (S.C. 1960) (declaring that a 
milk price-control law is an illegitimate exercise of the police power), 
overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 
S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000). 
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 99 S.E.2d 665, 672 (S.C. 1957) 
(concluding that a non-signer clause of the Fair Trade Act violates 
substantive due process). 
Painter v. Forest Acres, 97 S.E.2d 71, 73 (S.C. 1957) (determining that 
an ordinance requiring all businesses to close at midnight is an unlawful 
exercise of the police power). 
State v. Standard Oil Co., 10 S.E.2d 778, 790 (S.C. 1940) (affirming the 
trial court’s conclusion that a restriction on tying the price of a commodity 
to the quantity sold violates substantive due process). 
McCoy v. Town of York, 8 S.E.2d 905, 908 (S.C. 1940) (holding that a 
restriction on the amount of gasoline that may be transported is 
unreasonable and arbitrary). 
South Dakota 
State v. Nuss, 114 N.W.2d 633, 637 (S.D. 1962) (striking down a law 
that limits the amount of advance tuition that may be collected at $25 as 
violating substantive due process). 
City of Rapid City v. Schmitt, 71 N.W.2d 297, 298 (S.D. 1955) (holding 
that a requirement that only plumbing contractors may practice plumbing is 
an invalid exercise of the police power). 
City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 50 N.W.2d 797, 800 (S.D. 1951) 
(concluding that an apprentice requirement in order to obtain a plumbing 
license is an unreasonable exercise of the police power). 
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Tennessee 
Livesay v. Tenn. Bd. of Exam’rs in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 213 
(Tenn. 1959) (holding that a watchmaking board’s power to license 
watchmakers violates substantive due process). 
Consumer’s Gasoline Stations v. City of Peelaski, 292 S.W.2d 735, 737 
(Tenn. 1956) (striking down a restriction on the size of gasoline tanks used 
by filling stations as violating the State’s Law of the Land Clause). 
State v. White, 288 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1956) (concluding that a 
restriction on the selling of gasoline for other than the posted price is an 
illegitimate exercise of the police power). 
Checker Cab Co. v. City of Johnson City, 216 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 
(Tenn. 1948) (determining that a town’s taxi permit scheme violated the 
State’s anti-monopoly clause). 
Texas 
Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland, 431 S.W.2d 511, 521 (Tex. 
1968) (concluding that a regulation requiring a power company to obtain a 
permit is an invalid use of the police power). 
Ex Parte Rodgers, 371 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1963) (striking down an 
ordinance banning the storage of gasoline in underground tanks of more 
than 1,500 gallons as lacking a reasonable basis). 
Marney v. State, 330 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (holding 
that a statute banning the possession of mercury without written 
authorization placed an “unreasonable restriction on the use and enjoyment 
of a lawful commodity”). 
San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 
1957) (striking down a bar on grocery stores selling items below-cost as 
violating substantive due process). 
Utah 
Leetham v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1974) (striking down a 
statute requiring that cosmetologists only render services to females as 
violating substantive due process). 
Dodge Town v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1971) (“We are 
unable to see that the banning of automobile sales on Sunday would so 
affect the public health, morals, safety or welfare as to justify the 
interdiction of this statute under the police power.”). 
Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 1962) 
(concluding that a restriction on the placement of gas price signs violates 
the right to own and enjoy property). 
Salt Lake City v. Revene, 124 P.2d 537, 511 (Utah 1942) (determining 
SANDERS OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:00:52 PM 
532 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:457 
that an ordinance regulating barber hours is an invalid exercise of the 
police power). 
Vermont 
Vermont Salvage Corp. v. St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188, 197 (Vt. 1943) 
(striking down a licensing ordinance of junkyards as an invalid exercise of 
the police power). 
Virginia 
Alford v. City of Newport News, 260 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1979) 
(holding that ordinance requiring “no smoking” signs in restaurants gives 
patrons an unfounded belief that their area will not contain smoke, because 
only their table may be smoke-free, and that the law therefore is 
unreasonable and violates substantive due process). 
Joyner v. Centre Motor Co., 66 S.E.2d 469, 474 (Va. 1951) (striking 
down restrictions on car dealerships as “not in the interest of the public 
health, morals, safety or general welfare”). 
Moore v. Sutton, 39 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Va. 1946) (concluding that a 
photography licensing scheme violates the right to pursue a calling). 
Washington 
Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 419 P.2d 993, 999 (Wa. 1966) (holding that 
an ordinance forbidding certain store departments from opening is an 
invalid exercise of the police power). 
Lenci v. Seattle, 388 P.2d 926, 935-36 (Wa. 1964) (concluding that an 
ordinance is unreasonable when it allows wrecking yards to have only one 
access onto a public way). 
Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wa. 1959) 
(striking down a non-signer clause of the Fair Trade Act as an invalid 
exercise of the police power). 
West Virginia 
Thorne v. Roush, 261 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W.Va. 1979) (concluding that an 
apprenticeship requirement for barbers violates substantive due process). 
State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965) (striking down a 
cigarette minimum price law as violating substantive due process), 
overruled by Hartsock-Fisher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery 
Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984). 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W.Va. 
1958) (holding that the Fair Trade Act violates substantive due process). 
State v. Mem’l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101 S.E.2d 425, (W.Va. 1957) 
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(deciding that the regulation of pre-need sales of funeral items violates 
substantive due process), overruled by Whitener v. West Va. Bd. of 
Embalmers & Funeral Dirs., 288 S.E.2d 543, 545 (W.Va. 1982). 
State ex rel. Schroath v. Condry, 83 S.E.2d 470, 477 (W.Va. 1954) 
(concluding that requiring leased automobiles to be classified as common 
carriers is an improper use of the police power). 
Wisconsin 
Peppies Courtesy Cab Co. v. Kenosha, 475 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Wis. 
1991) (holding that an ordinance imposing dress and grooming 
requirements upon taxi drivers is unreasonable). 
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. La Follette, 169 N.W.2d 441, 451 (Wis. 1969) 
(striking down a requirement of a three-man crew for single train engines 
operating outside railroad yards as lacking a rational basis). 
Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. v. City of Tomah, 141 N.W.2d 299, 304-05 (Wis. 
1966) (concluding that an ordinance prohibiting gasoline delivery trucks of 
more than 1,500 gallons lacks a rational basis). 
Wyoming 
Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 437 (Wyo. 1964) (holding that 
a Sunday closing law violates state constitution’s prohibition on “absolute, 
arbitrary power”). 
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 420-
21 (Wyo. 1962) (concluding that the Fair Trade Act’s non-signer clause 
violates substantive due process). 
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APPENDIX B 
State-by-state, decade-by-decade summary of cases enumerated in 
Appendix A. 
 
State 1940 
- 49 
1950
- 59 
1960
-69 
1970
-79 
1980
-89 
1990
-99 
2000 - 
presen
t 
Total 
Alabama 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 7 
Alaska N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Arkansas 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 10 
California 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 
Colorado 0 3 3 2 0 0 0 8 
Connecticut 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 8 
Delaware 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Florida 3 9 8 4 3 1 1 29 
Georgia 0 4 1 2 2 0 0 9 
Hawaii N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Illinois 2 7 1 3 0 2 1 16 
Indiana 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Iowa 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Kansas 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 6 
Kentucky 6 2 3 2 2 0 0 15 
Louisiana 1 1 3 2 1 0 0 8 
Maine 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 5 
Maryland 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 
Massachusetts 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 7 
Michigan 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Minnesota 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mississippi 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Missouri 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Montana 1 2 3 0 0 1 0 7 
Nebraska 4 3 5 2 0 0 0 14 
Nevada 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
New 
Hampshire 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 7 
New Mexico 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
New York 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 
North Carolina 2 3 4 3 1 0 0 13 
North Dakota 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Ohio 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 9 
Oklahoma 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 7 
Oregon 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Pennsylvania 5 8 1 1 0 0 1 15 
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 8 
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South Dakota 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Tennessee 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Texas 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 
Utah 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 4 
Vermont 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Virginia 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Washington 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
West Virginia 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 5 
Wisconsin 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 
Wyoming 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 68 96 67 48 11 8 3  
 
